The Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh

The Reasons for the Aggravation of the Situation and Prospects for Its Development

 

Victor Hvozd
Doctor of Military Sciences

 

Since the end of September 2020, a new problem in the post-Soviet space has been the sharp escalation of the armed confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact, it has the largest scale since the Armenian-Azerbaijani war of 1991–1994, during which Armenia, with the support of Russia, occupied the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and a number of neighboring Azerbaijani territories.

For 26 years, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has remained unresolved, due to both fundamental differences in the interests of Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia’s position, which is using the situation to strengthen its position in the Caucasus. At this, as in the case of other conflicts in the countries of the former USSR, neither the UN and the OSCE, nor the world’s leading states, can really influence its settlement.

 

…Armenia’s policy towards Nagorno-Karabakh is completely identical to Russia’s policy towards the occupied territories in the East of Ukraine…

Thus, Armenia considers Nagorno-Karabakh its “historic territory”, which was illegally transferred to Azerbaijan after the collapse of the Russian Empire and the emergence of the USSR. Based on this, Armenia rejects any plans to return Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Yerevan justifies this position by the Nagorno-Karabakh population’s right to self-determination, which was implemented in the 1991 referendum.

The Azerbaijani territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, which were occupied by Armenia, are considered by Yerevan a buffer zone with Azerbaijan. Despite this, Yerevan agrees to return some of them to Azerbaijan in case Baku gives away Nagorno-Karabakh.

At the same time, Yerevan officially denies Armenia’s involvement in the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, and does not recognize the presence of Armenian troops on its territory. Besides, Armenia does not officially recognize the Nagorno-Karabakh republic. By this approach, Yerevan is trying to maintain control over Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as to avoid accusations of violations of international law.

As part of its policy, Armenia relies on the support from Russia, which is its ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and a partner in the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia is supported by the Armenian lobby in the political and economic circles of the United States, France and other Western countries.

In fact, Armenia’s policy towards Nagorno-Karabakh is completely identical to Russia’s policy towards the occupied territories in the East of Ukraine.

…Azerbaijan insists on the unconditional return of all the territories occupied by Armenia and does not agree to make any concessions…

In turn, Azerbaijan insists on the unconditional return of all the territories occupied by Armenia and does not agree to make any concessions. At this, given the practical impossibility of peaceful restoring the country’s territorial integrity, Baku relies on military force.

Since the second half of the 1990s, after the strengthening of power in Azerbaijan, as well as the restoration of the Azerbaijani economy, Baku has been working to reinforce the country’s armed forces. Due to this, Azerbaijan has already achieved a significant preponderance of forces over Armenia in terms of its military potential. At the same time, Baku does not give up trade and economic cooperation with Russia.

Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan

As noted above, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is being used by Russia for its own purposes. First of all, they include: strengthening Russia’s position and increasing its military presence in the Caucasus; keeping Armenia in the sphere of Russian influence and involving Azerbaijan in it; restraining the expansion of Turkey and the United States in the Black Sea-Caucasian region; opposition to the USA’s and the EU’s plans to create a “Southern Energy Corridor” bypassing Russia.

…Russia acts as a mediator in resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but it secretly maintains tensions around Nagorno-Karabakh…

To achieve these goals, Russia pursues a dual policy, namely: on the one hand, it acts as a mediator in resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan; on the other, it secretly maintains tensions around Nagorno-Karabakh.

In particular, Moscow is the co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, which was established in 1992 to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This implies taking a neutral position. However, Russia is not only openly on the side of Armenia, but also maintains its military base there with one motorized infantry brigade and one aviation regiment.

Besides, Russia supplies weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, which they use during hostilities on the line of contact. And if Azerbaijan’s or Armenia’s actions threaten Russia’s interests, Moscow provokes tensions between them, which allows it to influence their positions.

However, Russia refrains from directly interfering in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The reason for this is Moscow’s desire to avoid a direct confrontation with Turkey in the Caucasus and additional problems in relations with the West.

…Ankara is on Baku’s side in its desire to regain control over the Armenian-occupied territories of Azerbaijan…

Turkey has its own plans for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, being interested in weakening Russia’s position in the Caucasus and strengthening own influence in the region. To this end, Ankara is on Baku’s side in its desire to regain control over the Armenian-occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

For example, Turkey provides political support to Azerbaijan; supplies it with weapons (in particular, unmanned aerial vehicles); exerts pressure on Moscow and Yerevan by demonstrating force during periods of escalations of the conflict; continues the economic and transport blockade of Armenia.

At this, Turkey not only demonstrates its readiness to fiercely defend its interests against Russia, including in the military sphere, but also shows this in practice (in particular, in Syria and Libya). Especially as the potential of Turkish forces in the Black Sea-Caucasus region is 1.5–2 times greater than that of Russia’s there. However, Ankara is not interested in a direct military confrontation with Russia.

…The United States and Europe support, at the official level, the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but, in fact, agree to “freezing” the conflict on Armenia’s terms…

The UN, the OSCE, the EU, NATO, the USA and other leading countries of the world are in favor of a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But the United States’ and Europe’s positions are also dual. For example, at the official level, they support the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but, in fact, agree to “freezing” the conflict on Armenia’s terms. By this approach, the West seeks to prevent resumption of large-scale hostilities in the Caucasus, as this would have negative consequences for the whole of Europe.

At the same time, like Turkey, the United States and the European Union are interested in weakening Russia’s position in the Caucasus and strengthening own influence in the region. Based on such interests, Western countries are making efforts to develop political and economic relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

However, neither the world’s collective security organizations nor the United States or Europe can really influence the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh. In view of this, their response to cases of the conflict’s escalation is largely limited to calls for peace.

Despite the fact that Russia, Turkey, the United States and Europe refrained from directly interfering in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, although they pursued their interests there, they ensured a certain balance of forces in the region. As a result, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan remained in a stable state of tension, but without resumption of large-scale hostilities on the line of confrontation.

 

In 2020, the situation in the region changed significantly as a result of the global crisis related to the COVID-19 epidemic and the destabilization of the global oil market. Worsening of internal problems in Russia, Turkey and the United States, as well as other leading countries of the world, diverted their attention from the Caucasus, which led to a decrease in the effectiveness of deterrents for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

As a result, unlike in previous years, local incidents on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border escalated into a large-scale military conflict between the two countries, which has become especially active since the end of September this year.

Thus, in response to Armenian armed provocations in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, Azerbaijan has launched an offensive operation aimed at:

  • as minimum — improving the operational and tactical position of Azerbaijani troops on the front line by pushing the enemy and establishing control over the dominant heights;
  • as maximum — liberation of part or all of the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia.
Hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh since the end of September 2020

Within the framework of the operation, the Azerbaijani army is launching an offensive in three main directions, namely: from the north, northeast and southeast. Since September 27, 2020, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces have broken through the first line of defense of Armenian troops on several sections of the front and continue to carry out their tasks.

The greatest progress has been made in the south of the conflict zone, due to the flat nature of the area in this part of the theater of operations. Thus, Azerbaijan managed to liberate about 15–20 settlements in Jabrail and Fizuli districts, including the city of Jabrail. According to military experts, Azerbaijan’s consolidation of its positions in the region will allow it to continue the offensive towards the city of Fuzuli and the administrative center of Nagorno-Karabakh — the city of Stepanakert.

At the same time, in the north, Azerbaijan has liberated several settlements in the Terter district, blocked the Vardenis — Agdera road, which connects Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, and taken control of a number of dominant heights. The latter allowed the Azerbaijani army to significantly improve its position on the front line, namely — to get out of the lowlands, where it was before, to the highlands, which were in the hands of Armenian troops. Thus, Azerbaijan has obtained convenient bridgeheads for further development of the offensive in the depths of the occupied territories.

At the same time, the offensive of the Azerbaijani army is complicated by the highlands, where the Armenian troops have advantages in the organization of defense. In view of this, Azerbaijan continues to actively use combat drones to destroy Armenian military targets, as well as move to a larger use of heavy weapons (including heavy flamethrower systems “Solntsepek”) and front-line bombers. Both sides also use operational and tactical missile systems to strike at the rear.

All this leads to further intensification of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, an increase in the number of civilian casualties, and the threat of destruction of critical infrastructure.

 

Possible development of the situation in the conflict zone in Nagorno-Karabakh

These circumstances allow us to make a forecast on possible development of the situation in the conflict zone in Nagorno-Karabakh according to the following main scenarios:

  • Scenario One — Armenia and Azerbaijan (mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group) reach an armistice agreement. In this case, the conflict will return to the “conditionally frozen” state with the possibility of its new activation;
  • Scenario Two— stabilization of the front line in Nagorno-Karabakh on new frontiers and the transition of hostilities into a protracted positional form. In such a situation, the parties will exchange blows, but without significant progress;
  • Scenario Three— development of the successes achieved by Azerbaijan, breaking through the second line of defense of the Armenian troops and further liberation of the occupied territories;
  • Scenario Four— escalation of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan into a major Caucasus war with direct intervention of Russia and Turkey. NATO can side with Turkey.

Today, the situation is actually developing according to the second and third scenarios. The further course of events will depend on: the balance of forces between Armenia and Azerbaijan; political will of the parties to the conflict; influence on the situation by external forces and their possible intervention in the conflict.

 

…The development of situation will depend on the balance of forces and political will of the parties to the conflict, as well as influence on the situation by external forces…

Despite losses from both sides, Azerbaijan currently has an advantage over Armenia by its military potential. With this in mind, the Azerbaijani leadership remains firm and continues its offensive. At this, Baku agrees to the possibility of a peaceful solution to the conflict only after the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

In turn, Armenia is increasingly facing a real threat of defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh. The reality of such prospects forces Yerevan to move from tough declarations to Azerbaijan to attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully. At the same time, Armenia is trying to strengthen its position by receiving military assistance from Russia and the CSTO. To this end, Yerevan claims Azerbaijan’s aggression directly against Armenia, as well as Turkey’s intervention in the conflict.

Under the circumstances, Russia continues to call on the parties to the conflict for peace, but so far refrains from direct military support for Armenia. As before, the reasons for this are Moscow’s unwillingness to enter into a direct confrontation with Turkey, and to create a reason for further complication of relations with the West. Besides, Russia’s economic problems are forcing it to cut military spending. At this, Moscow refers to the impossibility of applying the Collective Security Treaty, as Nagorno-Karabakh is not formally part of Armenia. At the same time, based on the experience of the 1991–1994 war, Russia can supply Armenia with weapons as well as send mercenaries.

For its part, Turkey provides political support to Azerbaijan (including on the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the conflict only after Armenia withdraws its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh) and continues to supply weapons for the needs of the Azerbaijani army. Turkey also refrains from directly intervening in the conflict.

The position of the UN, the OSCE, the EU, the United States and leading European countries, which are in favor of putting an end to hostilities but do not intervene in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, remains unchanged. However, Washington and Paris provide moral support to Armenia, which may be a consequence of the work of the Armenian lobby in the United States and France, as well as American and European disagreements with Turkey.

The situation under consideration may take on a different character in case if Azerbaijan occupies key positions in Nagorno-Karabakh (including the liberation of the city of Stepanakert) or if the combat actions move to Armenian territory. This could prompt Russia to directly intervene in the conflict with forces of its military base on Armenian territory. In addition, Russia can strengthen its forces in Armenia by sending additional troops through Iran. We should not rule out Russia’s attack on Azerbaijan from the Caspian direction (from the common border between the two countries). Today, this scenario is already being voiced by some Russian politicians.

Under such circumstances, Turkey will inevitably intervene in the conflict on the side of Azerbaijan. Ankara has already expressed readiness to provide military assistance to Baku in case of need.

The United States, France and Russia are putting pressure on Azerbaijan through diplomatic channels to persuade it to cease hostilities. Moreover, they are likely to threaten him with sanctions. In particular, at the initiative of Moscow, the Eurasian Economic Union has already increased tariffs on Azerbaijani steel.

As a result, Baku can enter into peace talks with Yerevan, but only from a position of strength. Moreover, the capture of the dominant heights on the front line in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the liberation of a number of settlements has already allowed Azerbaijan to partially achieve its goals. However, the truce between Azerbaijan and Armenia will not be stable.

 

…Baku can enter into peace talks with Yerevan, but only from a position of strength. However, the truce between Azerbaijan and Armenia will not be stable…

In general, the development of situation around Nagorno-Karabakh allows us to draw the following conclusions:

  • during the current year, the global crisis related to the COVID-19 epidemic and the destabilization of the world oil market have caused changes in the entire system of international relations, including in the context of imbalance of forces in crisis and conflict zones;
  • these trends are also characteristic of the post-Soviet space, as shown by the escalation of the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh to the highest level since 1991–1994;
  • on the one hand, the resumption of large-scale hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan confirms the de facto impossibility of a political settlement of the conflicts in the countries of the former USSR, and on the other hand, it shows Russia’s further losing its influence in the world;
  • in fact, the CSTO, which has in no way been able to assist Armenia in its confrontation with Azerbaijan, is also completely incapable. This undermines Moscow’s attempts to present the “Caucasus-2020” SCPE as a demonstration of the unity of the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

All this allows Ukraine to return to more active position to restore the territorial integrity of the state. To date, Moscow has largely lost its ability to counter, including through the use of military force.

 

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