Changes at the Front and Russia’s Reaction to Them. What Should We Expect Further?

Ivan Sichen

Domestic and foreign experts have already repeatedly assessed the changes in Russia’s war against Ukraine after the start of Ukrainian troops’ counteroffensive in late summer – autumn 2022. The main conclusion is that Ukraine intercepted Russia’s operational-tactical initiative in most sections of the front. This situation deals a powerful blow to the image of V. Putin and the reputation of the Russian troops, even among the chauvinistic political forces inside Russia and the part of the Russian population zombified by imperial propaganda. And this is already undermining the foundations of power of the entire regime of V. Putin, which he cannot allow. So, Russia is taking a number of measures with the aim of restoring its dominance at the front or, at least, blocking the counteroffensive of Ukrainian troops. Let’s analyze those measures in more detail and forecast possible consequences.

According to most experts, Russia’s failures at the front in the fall of 2022 put it in an extremely difficult position both from a military and political points of view.

For one, on the northeastern part of the front, Ukrainian troops deprived Russia of a bridgehead in Kharkiv region, reached the western border of Luhansk region, and liberated several settlements in there. This made it much more difficult for Russia to conduct a second offensive in the Kharkiv direction, and also nullified its efforts to establish complete control over the entire Luhansk region.

In the Donbas, Russia is stuck in positional battles and for four months now it cannot boast of tangible successes. Moreover, Russian troops were pushed back not only from Izyum, but also to some distance from Bakhmut, the main focus of their offensive. In this section of the front, the balance of forces between the Russian and Ukrainian troops also changed. According to some estimates, while earlier Russia outnumbered Ukraine by almost 10 times in terms of the number of missile and artillery systems, now according to this indicator the parties have practically equalized. As a result, Russia loses hopes for taking full control of Donetsk region, including capturing the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

In the south of Ukraine, in particular on the right bank of Kherson region, Russian troops found themselves in a catastrophic situation. They are, in fact, encircled, they are extremely short of material and technical support. The Ukrainian troops continue their planned offensive, gradually cutting off Russians from the Dnipro River and forcing them to “shorten the front line”. Russia is already actively evacuating its occupation authorities from the right bank of Kherson region. In addition, Ukrainian troops are conducting an offensive in the south of Zaporizhzhia region in the direction of Melitopol. This creates a threat of encirclement of Russian troops also in the Dnipro regions of the left-bank part of Ukraine, which makes impossible the prospects of a Russian offensive on Mykolaiv and Odesa.

The chauvinistic circles of Russia react negatively to this situation, openly criticizing the Russian leadership for failures at the front and leaving the previously captured territories of Ukraine. Elements of criticism can already be seen in Russian state-controlled media and can be heard on central TV-channels. At the same time, anti-war moods are growing in the Russian society, which has finally become convinced of the impossibility of defeating Ukraine quickly.

All this undermines the stability of V. Putin’s regime, creating a real threat to it. Evidence of this trend is the aggravation of contradictions between different political and economic groups in the ruling elite of Russia, and the growing tensions between various power structures.

Even a number of MPs of local legislative bodies of Russia advocated V. Putin’s resignation, accusing him of treason. Among other things, they mention V. Putin’s inability to achieve his goals regarding the “demilitarization” of Ukraine, which, on the contrary, is strengthening its military potential thanks to the help of the West; the failure of his efforts to stop the process of NATO expansion, which led to the opposite consequences — the beginning of the process of Finland’s and Sweden’s Euro-Atlantic integration; undermining the combat capability of the Russian Armed Forces due to significant losses of personnel and combat equipment on the fronts in Ukraine.

In order to prevent further development of the mentioned processes, the leadership of the Russian Federation is taking additional measures in order to change the situation at the front in its favor. In general, they are quite well-known, but it is not superfluous to analyze them in a single complex.

Back on September 21, 2022, V. Putin announced a partial mobilization in the country to replenish losses at the front, as well as to form new units for combat operations against Ukraine. According to the announced plan, 300,000 reservists were supposed to be called up for military service.

According to the military leadership of the Russian Federation, the mobilization has actually been completed. The mobilized are provided with all they need; all planned financial payments are made from the federal budget. A set of benefits is implemented for the mobilized and members of their families. The mobilized are sent to training centers.

The real state of affairs with the mobilized shows exactly the opposite. According to many public reports, servicemen called up for mobilization are very poorly provided with uniforms, means of personal protection, food, etc. There is almost no heavy weaponry, the outdated small arms are rusted. The living conditions of the mobilized are absolutely bad, there is no training as such and no financial payments.

At the same time, in September – October 2022, the mobilization of the Russian economy began. The basis for this was the law on special measures in the economy, signed by V. Putin in July 2022, which allows the country’s economy to be military reoriented during military operations abroad. It is reported that the volume of production of weapons and military equipment, as well as the production of other products for military purposes, is increasing at the enterprises of the defense industry. Civil enterprises of all forms of ownership are also reorienting to this.

They are looking for possibilities to get military equipment and ammunition from other countries. For example, Belarus is already transferring tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery systems to Russia, as well as ammunition from the Belarusian armed forces and long-term storage warehouses. Besides, Russia purchased about a thousand of Iranian combat drones.

Relying on the existing and additional resources obtained through mobilization measures and the purchase of weapons from other countries, strengthening defenses in Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, Russia is trying to block the counteroffensive of Ukrainian troops. Reserves from among mobilized reservists, military equipment and ammunition are sent there. Long-term engineering structures are being built. At the same time, Russia does not stop offensive operations in certain sections of the front. First of all, in the Bakhmut and Avdiyivka directions in the Donbas.

Russia is also increasing pressure on Belarus, planning to involve it in the war against Ukraine and make it a full participant in Putin’s aggression. It demands from Belarus to provide its infrastructure for the deployment of Russian troops for their actions against Ukraine. Thereby, Russia is trying to create additional opportunities for a new attack on Ukraine from the northern direction and to demonstrate to Kyiv such an opportunity to divert Ukrainian military resources from the east and south of our country.

In October 2022, the deployment was announced of a joint group of troops of Russia and Belarus with a total number of 70,000 servicemen. For this, 20,000 soldiers and officers of the Russian Armed Forces, mainly recently mobilized, will be sent to Belarus. Some of them have already arrived at their destination.

The Kremlin is also strengthening its control over the situation in Russia’s border regions with Ukraine and in the occupied territories of our country. According to V. Putin’s decree dated October 19, 2022, the “medium-level response regime” was introduced there. The leaders of those regions of Russia and the occupation administrations of the captured territories of Ukraine are entrusted with the responsibilities of conducting mobilization activities, meeting the needs of the army and the population, performing the tasks of territorial and civil defense, etc.

Moscow’s actions in the military sphere were reinforced by a political act on the annexation of the occupied territories of Ukraine. September 30, 2022, after holding pseudo-referendums in the occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, V. Putin signed “agreements on their becoming part of Russia”.

The aim of such decisions of the Kremlin is the desire to raise the morale of Russians by demonstrating “new territorial possessions”, to justify a full-scale war against our state, as well as to restrain the advance of Ukrainian troops in the hope that they will not advance in the directions of those Ukrainian regions that Moscow called “its own”.

In general, such measures did enable Russia to achieve certain results, namely: to strengthen the defense on the main lines of attack of Ukrainian troops; to strengthen own offensive capabilities (primarily in the Donbas); to force Ukraine to increase its troops protecting the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, which made it attract additional resources that could be used in other sections of the front.

After the Russian Armed Forces complete the process of training of the mobilized reservists, form new units, and receive additional weapons, the situation at the front may become even more difficult for Ukraine. At this, in case if Russia accumulates a sufficient number of forces and means, as well as achieves success on the front, it can again attack Ukraine from the northern and northeastern directions, including jointly with Belarus.

The above-mentioned threats are quite obviously monitored and taken into account by Ukraine, which takes appropriate countermeasures. In particular, replenishment is being prepared, new units are being formed, and the defense of the northern and northeastern borders of Ukraine is being strengthened. In addition, our Western partners do not stop supplying us with armored vehicles, missile, artillery and air defense systems, UAVs, ammunition, etc. As a result, the balance of power of the parties actually remains unchanged.

And therefore, the Russian troops can hardly hope for future success, without having them now. Especially as Russia faced a number of significant problems in carrying out mobilization. These are difficulties with supporting the mobilized, their low motivation for serving in the army and participating in the war. All other problems of Russia’s so-called special operation in Ukraine, which we mentioned earlier, remain.

Russia is well aware of such realities, and that is why it has turned to open terror of the civilian population of Ukraine, systematically launching missile strikes on critical Ukrainian infrastructure facilities. With such strikes, Russia is trying to cause an energy crisis in Ukraine on the eve of winter in order to force our country to capitulate. Drones obtained from Iran are used for the same purpose.

Another terrorist act by Moscow with significantly more serious consequences could be blowing up the Kakhovska HPP dam on the Dnipro River in order to divert the attention of Russians from the failures of Russian troops in the Kherson section of the front and to take revenge on Ukraine by destroying its important energy facility. Besides, in its usual manner, Russia can accuse Ukraine of undermining the HPP in order to discredit it both in the eyes of the Ukrainian population and in the eyes of the world.

We must not forget about Russia’s nuclear blackmail. V. Putin and other representatives of the Russian government openly threaten not only Ukraine, but also the entire Western world, with nuclear weapons. And Russia’s military doctrine allows for the possibility of nuclear strikes even on non-nuclear countries.

Against the background of such threats, Moscow is already engaged in nuclear terrorism in practice. As we remember, on the very first day of the war, Russia seized the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, where it deployed its military base. In March 2022, the same thing happened at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. Currently, Russian military equipment is hidden in the machine rooms of the station, and Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk region is constantly being shelled from its territory.

What else should we expect from Russian terrorists who call themselves “armed forces”? Except for accusations of Ukraine’s intention to use a “dirty nuclear bomb”, which they themselves are ready to use.

However, nothing will help terrorist Russia. Even after army general S. Surovikin, known for his war crimes in Syria, was appointed commander in the war against Ukraine. It was under his command that the peaceful Syrian population was destroyed by missile and bomb strikes. He is currently using the same strategy in Ukraine. But Ukraine is not Syria. It has something to answer the opponent, and it does it successfully.

Therefore, Russia is making every possible effort to restore its dominant position in the war against Ukraine. However, Ukraine does not allow it to realize such intentions. As a result, the war is increasingly taking the form of a struggle to exhaust the forces and resources of the parties. However, this in no way means reducing the role and importance of the purely military component of war. In the near future, Russia may intensify and expand the scale of offensive operations in various directions, which will significantly aggravate the situation at the front.