Moscow’s further actions will depend on results of the battle for Donbas

Ivan Sichen

Today, the central theme in the development of the Russia’s war against Ukraine is the so-called battle for the Donbas. It is on its results that Moscow’s further actions will depend. For example, in case of Moscow’s victory on this section of the front, the Russian army is likely to continue the offensive deep into Ukraine. The main directions of its actions may be Kharkiv, Kyiv, Zaporizhzhya, Mykolaiv and Odesa. At the same time, a significant problem for Moscow in implementing its plans is the difficulty of replenishing and building up Russian troops.

Based on the above-mentioned circumstances, we would like to make a generalized assessment of the situation and a forecast of what to expect next. These issues become especially relevant because of some media reports about the threat of a new attack by Russia on Kharkiv and Kyiv in the coming days. Such reports lead to the spread of panic among certain segments of the Ukrainian population, which is unacceptable during the war and only plays into the hands of the enemy.

According to most experts, after the failure of Moscow’s plans to capture all of Ukraine, the most likely goals of the Russian Armed Forces may be:

• occupation of the entire territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as creation of a “buffer zone” around them from the adjacent territories of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya regions;
• maintaining control over the land corridor to Crimea (including Kherson region and the south of Zaporizhzhya region), as well as capturing the city of Mariupol.

If these goals are achieved without significant losses of Russian troops, Moscow can return to its strategic intentions to establish control over the whole of Ukraine. At this, the priority efforts of the RF Armed Forces will be focused on the cities of Kharkiv, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Mykolayiv and Odesa.

However, solving these tasks, even with a limited objective (reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and capturing the city of Mariupol), requires Russia to replenish its troops, strengthen and regroup them, which is a very serious problem.

For example, the losses of the Russian Armed Forces in hostilities on Ukrainian territory have obviously exceeded all the Kremlin’s calculations. According to various estimates, as of the end of the first decade of April 2022, they amounted to 30 % to 60 % of the forces that Russia had gathered for the war against Ukraine. In particular, out of 120 battalion tactical groups, 20 were completely destroyed and another 40 significantly lost their combat capability.

The total losses of the Russian Armed Forces today reach more than 19 thousand dead and 60 thousand wounded servicemen, more than 700 tanks, 1.9 thousand armored combat vehicles, 335 artillery systems and 110 MLRS, 150 aircrafts and 140 helicopters, 1.4 thousand military vehicles. This is equivalent to the most powerful military formation of the Russian Armed Forces, the 1^st Tank Army or the 20^th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District of the RF Armed Forces. And by aircrafts – to the most powerful 4^th Army of the Air Force and Air Defense, which is located in the North Caucasus.

The fact of significant losses of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine was officially acknowledged by the Press Secretary of the President of Russia D. Peskov, who called them a “huge tragedy”.

At this, Moscow has significant difficulties both in compensating for such losses and in forming the second echelon of its troops to expand the offensive in the Donbas and consolidate Russia’s position in the region. The reasons for this situation are:

• poor condition of Russian military units that were withdrawn from Kyiv in order to redirect them to the Donbas. According to local residents of Bryansk and Kursk regions of Russia bordering on Ukraine, many military vehicles were damaged (burnt, damaged or unable to move on their own), and ambulances evacuated many wounded, including in critical condition;
• demoralization of the Russian Armed Forces due to unexpected problems in conducting the “special operation” in Ukraine, namely – fierce resistance of Ukraine’s defense forces, negative attitude of most Ukrainians to the Russian invasion, incompetence of the Russian military command, and delays in paying financial allowances to the servicemen involved in hostilities. In view of this, a significant number of soldiers and officers refuse to continue to participate in the war against Ukraine and, in general, to serve in the Russian army;
• the failure of Moscow’s attempts to replenish the Russian army by voluntarily hiring contractors and recruiting reservists through the “BARS” (“Russian Combat Army Reserve”). Given the above problems in conducting the “special operation” in Ukraine, Russian citizens of these categories are massively refusing to serve in the armed forces. This situation calls into question the Kremlin’s ability to implement plans to recruit 60,000 people to the Russian army to continue the war against Ukraine;

Lack of equipment to restore the combat capabilities of troops taking part or having taken part in the “special operation” in Ukraine, as well as the replenishing of new units. As you know, most of the weapons stored in warehouses are obsolete and out of order. And their repair is complicated by the lack of components (primarily bearings, electrical and electronic equipment) due to Western sanctions. This is what forces Russia to turn to its partners, including China and North Korea, for help in obtaining weapons and necessary spare parts. However, they are unwilling or unable to meet the needs of the Russian army.

These circumstances have a direct impact on Russia’s military actions in Ukraine and the situation on the front lines. Thus, due to the lack of forces at present, Russia has the opportunity to conduct active offensive operations only on three directions, namely:

• from the area of Izyum to the south in order to surround the Ukrainian troops in the Donbas. Logistics of the actions of the Russian troops is carried out from the Belgorod region of Russia through the occupied part of Kharkiv region (railway station in Kupyansk), which is another problem due to the inability of Russian troops to fully control these territories;
• from the occupied areas in the south of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhya regions in order to capture the city of Mariupol;
• from the “DPR” and “LPR” towards the cities of Maryinka, Avdiivka, Popasna and Severodonetsk in order to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and destroy Ukrainian troops in the area.

In other parts of the front, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhya, and Kharkiv regions, Russia’s armed forces are forced to conduct defensive operations to hold the occupied frontiers.

At present, Russia has not had decisive success in any of these areas or sections of the front. All of them, in fact, are protracted positional fighting.

In turn, this indicates the emergence of a certain balance of power between Ukraine and Russia and the war’s turning into a form of struggle for depletion. At this, according to analysts, such changes are more beneficial for Ukraine than for Russia.

Thus, Ukraine will gain time to strengthen its defense to form new units, obtain weapons from foreign partners and build up the defense lines in the probable directions of the enemy’s offensive. And Ukraine’s economic losses are offset by aid from the United States, the European Union and some European and other countries.

In contrast, the prolongation of the war is undermining Russia’s economy through Western sanctions and complicating the full range of problems associated with its armed forces. Under such circumstances, in order to change the situation in its favor, Moscow is intensifying missile attacks on residential, industrial and transport infrastructure of Ukraine, as well as preparing and deploying reserves to the Donbas.

But then, Moscow is not successful in its actions. The shelling of civilians by Russian troops only strengthens the determination of Ukraine’s defenders to counter the aggressor. As for the reserves, as noted above, Russia has limited opportunities to form and use them against Ukraine.

To date, Russia can send to the Donbas no more than 20 battalion tactical groups, including: up to ten – from the troops withdrawn from the northern regions of Ukraine, and up to ten – from the 5^th Combined Arms Army from the RF’s Far East (the last of the armies that have not yet been involved in the war against our state). Of these, several battalion tactical groups have already entered the combat zone in the East of Ukraine, while others are reportedly on the way.

However, at best, using these reserves will allow Russia to achieve only isolated and temporary successes. Firstly, 20 battalion tactical groups are equal to the same forces that have already been destroyed in Ukraine. Secondly, Ukraine’s defense forces inflict losses on Russia’s reserves before they arrive. In particular, on April 10, 2022, one of the Russian military columns was defeated near the town of Izyum. The same obviously awaits all other reserves. And there is nothing more in Russia.

By the way, the myth of “undefeatable Russia’s army” was dispelled by the adviser to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine O. Arestovych. According to him, 60–90 thousand Russian troops in the Donbas are the only reserves in the East and South of Ukraine of the Russian Armed Forces, Rosguards, “DPR” and “LPR”. And this is the maximum of Russia’s capabilities. And there are no more than 30 to 40 thousand really combat-ready troops in the region.

Therefore, the strategy of Ukraine is completely correct, which provides for the exhaustion of the enemy in protracted hostilities with the maximum avoidance of losses among the civilian population and defenders of the country. And after Russia loses its military potential, we will be able to go on the offensive. And not only to liberate those territories of Ukraine that have been occupied by Russia since February 2022, but the entire Donbas and Crimea as well.

That’s when we will start real negotiations with Moscow, but only on the issues of denazification and final demilitarization of Russia, bringing Putin’s regime to justice for war crimes, as well as collecting reparations from him for the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine.

After the mass extermination of Ukrainian civilians by Russian troops, it is now simply impossible to talk to the Kremlin about anything else. And to deter Moscow’s aggression, Ukraine’s defense forces already include 400,000 fighters, and another 100,000 are preparing for hostilities. Let us also remind you that we have ten modern anti-tank missiles for each Russian tank, and the same number of MANPADS for each aircraft or helicopter.