Nuclear Blackmail as an Instrument of Russia’s Policy

Intimidation, Preparations for War and Provocations

Ivan Sichen

Since the 1950s, when the former USSR acquired nuclear weapons, Moscow has been constantly and purposefully using them as an instrument of its foreign policy. At this, Moscow not only resorts to nuclear blackmail of its adversaries, but also develops nuclear war plans against them, which are mastered during various military exercises. As a result of the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the temporary choice of the new Russian leadership to develop constructive relations with the United States and Europe, this practice was stopped. However, since the 2000s, modern Russia has returned to it as part of its renewed confrontation with the West. As before, Russia began to use nuclear blackmail to put pressure on its opponents, and intensified the process of modernizing and enhancing the combat capabilities of its nuclear missile forces. After the full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022, such measures by the Putin regime have reached a qualitatively new level, threatening with a nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States/NATO. All these problems are directly related to Ukraine, which may find itself under a nuclear attack from Russia. What is meant here?

As just mentioned, Moscow is constantly threatening its adversaries with nuclear weapons. These threats, which are de facto nuclear blackmail, become especially persistent and harsh when relations between Russia and the United States, NATO, and the EU deteriorate for some reasons. Since 2022, another trigger for the deterioration of relations between the parties has been Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, which provoked the West’s sharply negative reaction. In response to Moscow’s unprovoked aggression against an independent European state, Western countries significantly increased military assistance to Ukraine, took additional measures to build up their military capabilities both at the national level and within NATO in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, and imposed tough sanctions pressure on the Putin regime. In response, Russia started to openly demonstrate its readiness to use nuclear weapons against the West.

For example, immediately after the attack on Ukraine, V. Putin on a TV broadcast actually ordered to put the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation on high alert. In particular, the number of missiles ready for immediate use was increased, the staffs of command posts and launchers were reinforced, and mobile missile systems were deployed on combat patrol routes.

The tactical nuclear components of the Russian Armed Forces may also have been put on high alert. At least some of the tactical nuclear warheads were transferred from central arsenals of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry to district and naval storage facilities. Russia has also brought its tactical nuclear weapons closer to the borders of NATO countries. In particular, in 2023, Russian nuclear warheads were deployed in specially constructed storage facilities in Belarus. Along with this, the Russian military command began to more actively conduct military exercises on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Among them, the most illustrative was the joint Russian-Belarusian exercise in May-August 2024 on the territory of Belarus and Russia.

At the same time, the development of a new nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation began, which is justified by “the increasing aggressiveness of US and NATO policy”. Of course, the content of the document is not made public, but given the statements of the Russian leadership, it most likely provides for the possibility of preventive use of nuclear weapons (the existing doctrine allows the use of nuclear weapons only in response to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy or in case of critical threats to the existence of the Russian Federation and its territorial integrity).

Such an assumption is quite realistic, since after the failure of the Russian “blitzkrieg” against Ukraine in 2022, Moscow considered plans to launch a nuclear strike on our country under the pretext of the possible use of a “dirty bomb” by Kyiv. Only categorical warnings from the West and China, which threatened Russia with critical consequences, kept it from doing so. Nevertheless, the Russian Armed Forces regularly use a variety of strike weapons against Ukraine that can carry nuclear warheads: missiles from S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft systems; Iskander-M ballistic tactical missile systems; cruise missiles launched from Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS and Tu-160M strategic bombers, Kinzhal ballistic missiles from Mig-31 aircrafts; Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles; heavy aerial bombs from Su-24M, Su-30SM, Su-34 and Su-35S aircrafts; and 2S4 Tyulpan self-propelled heavy mortars.

In some cases, cruise and ballistic missiles equipped to carry nuclear warheads were launched at Ukraine (though without such warheads). Russia is trying to demonstrate its readiness to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine in order to put pressure on Ukraine’s leadership and society. However, Moscow not only seeks to intimidate Ukraine with nuclear strikes, but also actually does it in some way. For example, in 2022, missile strikes were launched against the Institute of Physics in Kyiv and the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, where experimental nuclear facilities are located and radioactive materials are stored. This posed a threat of radioactive contamination of the multi-million cities of Kyiv and Kharkiv, which would have been equal to the use of a “dirty bomb”.

Another extremely dangerous violation of nuclear safety principles was Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian nuclear power plants. As you know, back in February-March 2022, Russia took control of the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs. In addition, the Russians tried to seize the South Ukrainian NPP in Mykolaiv region, but failed to breakthrough the fierce resistance of Ukrainian troops. At this, Russia was trying to deprive Ukraine of powerful sources of electricity supply and to get the opportunity to use operating NPPs in its own interests. Besides, Russia viewed the seized NPPs as convenient and relatively safe places to base Russian troops in the Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia-Kherson, and Odesa directions. Also, the Russian military leadership took into consideration that Ukraine would not strike at nuclear power plants because of the threat of nuclear incidents.

Russian troops, along with military equipment and ammunition, were deployed at the Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia NPPs. The Russian military have built powerful systems of field engineering fortifications         

Fortunately, there is no longer a similar threat at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. The Russian invaders were forced to get out of there quickly as a result of their similarly forced escape from Kyiv region in April 2022. But even there, they managed to make a mess. For example, when the Russians were setting up field fortifications, they disturbed the soil layer that covered the radioactive contamination from the 1986 Chornobyl accident. The radioactive dust raised during the excavation fell near the Chornobyl NPP and in neighboring regions of Belarus and Russia.

The situation with Zaporizhzhia NPP is much more complicated. In addition to military threats, there are significant technological problems with the operation of this plant. “Rosatom”, which appropriated the Ukrainian nuclear power plant, has not been able to establish its normal functioning, even in a shutdown mode, due to a lack of qualified personnel. Most of the Ukrainian citizens who worked at the nuclear power plant did not want to remain under occupation, while “Rosatom” failed to replace them with the necessary number of Russian personnel.

Besides, due to power outages in the occupied territories as a result of hostilities, Russia cannot provide stable power supply to the NPP’s technological equipment, which must operate around the clock. This threatens with a large-scale accident with radioactive contamination. In addition, the Russian occupiers resort to provocations, in particular, setting fire to certain structures at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, accusing Ukraine of doing so. At this, Russia restricts access to the plant for IAEA inspectors.

There are also real military threats to other Ukrainian NPPs. For example, since the beginning of September 2024, more than 70 Russian UAVs and 30 cruise missiles bypassed them. On September 22, 2024, a Russian UAV tried to simulate an attack on the Khmelnytskyi NPP. Two years ago, in September 2022, a Russian missile exploded 300 meters from one of the reactors at the South Ukrainian NPP. A crater four meters in diameter and two meters deep was formed, the NPP building was damaged, hundreds of windows and a hydraulic unit were broken, and four power lines were cut. Electric substations and power distribution centers at the South Ukrainian NPP were also repeatedly damaged.

So far, such nuclear incidents have not occurred anywhere in the world. However, Russia is not concerned about the risk of accidents and disasters at Ukrainian NPPs. On the contrary, Moscow constantly raises the issue of the “Ukrainian threat” to its own nuclear power plants, using it as one of the elements of anti-Ukrainian propaganda. For example, Russia systematically accuses Ukraine of deliberate attacks on Russian NPPs, which, according to Russian propagandists, poses a danger to the West as well, as it would lead to radioactive contamination of the territory of Europe. In this way, Russia justifies its calls for the West to stop helping Ukraine, as it allegedly undermines its own security.

Moscow’s rhetoric intensified after Ukrainian troops broke through into Kursk region of Russia and brought the combat zone closer to the Kursk nuclear power plant. Another information reason for discrediting Ukraine was the Russian statement about the fall of the wreckage of downed missiles on the territory of the Kursk NPP on August 8, 2024. Moreover, unlike the situation with the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, Russia immediately invited IAEA representatives to the Kursk NPP and even managed to get IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi to visit. Summarizing his trip, he recognized the complexity of the situation around the Kursk NPP, but contrary to Moscow’s expectations, he did not support its accusations against Ukraine. On the contrary, in September 2024, the IAEA published a report on the facts of Russia’s deployment of its troops and weapons at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, as well as on the blocking of access to a number of buildings and premises of the Zaporizhzhia NPP for IAEA inspectors.

In order to discredit Ukraine, today the Russian leaders once again accuse Ukraine in plans to use a “dirty bomb”. Besides, the Russians have deployed radiation, chemical and biological control posts near the combat zone, which should make the situation more resonant. In order to destabilize the situation in Ukraine, Russian special services organized a massive email campaign on behalf of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine about the missile attack on the Rivne nuclear power plant, which allegedly caused radioactive contamination.

These actions of Russia are interconnected in nature and are part of a comprehensive strategy to use the nuclear leverage as an instrument of its foreign policy. In general, Russia’s strategy includes nuclear blackmail of opponents, preparations for the actual use of nuclear weapons, and various provocations. In this way, Russia is trying to gain an advantage in the global confrontation with the West, force it to make concessions in supporting Ukraine, and intimidate the Ukrainian government and society.

Russia’s nuclear blackmail will increase with the loss of its ability to defeat Ukraine by military means or to “freeze” the war on Russia’s terms. Therefore, Russia will continue to resort to nuclear threats to its adversaries, but will refrain from the actual use of nuclear weapons, as this would have catastrophic consequences for it. For example, despite the provisions of the current nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation, Moscow did not mention it after the breakthrough of Ukrainian troops into Kursk region in August 2024. At the same time, in case of a critical threat to the ruling regime, Putin’s Russia is capable of launching a nuclear war against Ukraine and the entire world.