The War in Kursk Region: Political and Military Conclusions

Ivan Sichen

In August 2024, Russia’s war against Ukraine began to acquire fundamentally new forms. To begin with, for the first time, Ukrainian troops moved ground combat operations on a relatively large scale to Russian territory, namely to Kursk region. So far, this has not had a decisive impact on the course of the war, but it has opened up such prospects. First of all, they relate to the possibility of positive changes in the development of the military-political situation around Ukraine and in the situation at the front. Many experts make assessments on these issues and cover them in the media. However, as a rule, they include analysts’ views on only some aspects of relevant events and trends. So, let’s try to bring them together into a single comprehensive system.

Some may ask an understandable question: why did Ukraine open the “Kursk front” and send significant forces there, while they are desperately needed in other areas where the enemy is actively attacking? And then they begin to criticize the decisions made by the Ukrainian leadership.

Therefore, it is important to give an adequate response, as even some members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine are openly criticizing such decisions. So, let us draw some generalized conclusions about the consequences and importance of the Ukrainian troops’ breakthrough to Russia’s territory. They are quite obvious.

Firstly, Ukraine has demonstrated the ability not only to deter Russia’s aggression, but also to transfer ground combat operations to Russian territory. And this — despite the fact that Russia has much greater military, economic, demographic, and other potentials than Ukraine. The achievements of Ukrainian troops have boosted the morale of Ukrainians and strengthened their confidence in the possibility of achieving victory, which is especially important after the failure of the Ukrainian offensive in the summer and autumn of 2023 and the success of the Russian troops in the first half of 2024.

Secondly, Ukraine’s Western partners have seen for themselves that our country has these capabilities. This confirms the expediency of their continuing to support Ukraine, including by increasing the supply of weapons and authorizing their use against targets on Russian territory. Besides, Ukraine’s position in possible negotiations with Russia on a peaceful end to the war is being strengthened. At the same time, the likelihood of backroom agreements between the West, China, and Russia on the terms of ending the war without taking into account Ukraine’s interests is decreasing.

Thirdly, the successes of Ukrainian troops in the Kursk region may open up prospects for restoring historical justice, namely, the return to Ukraine of territories that were torn away from it by Russia. These include the eastern districts of Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh regions, as well as the entire Belgorod region (which was transferred by the Soviet leadership to Russia in exchange for the inclusion of Crimea into Ukraine). Achieving these goals will allow Ukraine to protect Ukrainians living in those territories. This will mark the beginning of the disintegration of the Russian Federation.

Fourthly, the myths about Russia’s “greatness” and “invincibility” have been dispelled, and the ideas of building a “Russian world”, which have been and remain the basis of the ideology of all regimes ruling in the Kremlin — from Moscow princes to V. Putin — have been undermined. For the first time since the Second World War, foreign troops invade Russia, and the Russian army could not stop them. At the same time, the internal situation in the country has become even more aggravated due to new flows of refugees and the government’s inability and unwillingness to resolve this problem.

In other words, the Putin regime is losing control of the situation, and the objective result of such trends is the growth of anti-war sentiments in Russian society and the decline in the authority of the current government. That is why the Kremlin refuses to officially recognize the fact that the war has spread to Russian territory, and calls the attempts of the Russian army to push out the Ukrainian troops a “counterterrorist operation”. However, no one in Russian society believes such statements anymore, and some Russian propagandists even call on Russians to “recognize the loss of Kursk region”.

Fifthly, the fighting in Kursk region has begun to have an impact on the situation at the front. So far, this impact is limited, but it is forcing the Russian military command to transfer its last reserves to Kursk. They are not only being taken from the interior of the country, where Russian troops are being trained before being sent to Ukraine, but are also being transferred from the southern section of the front (from the occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions). This has resulted in a decrease in the activity of the Russian offensive at the front, with the exception of some of the most important areas for Russia. Besides, if Ukrainian troops disrupt the communication routes between Kursk and Belgorod regions, the logistics of Russian troops in the Kharkiv direction will be ruined.

Sixthly, China, as Russia’s main partner, has once again demonstrated a dismissive attitude to Russia. In fact, responding to the fighting in Kursk region, Beijing merely spoke out in favor of a peaceful end to the war, but did not support Russia or condemn Ukraine. Other Russian “partners” have taken similar positions. Therefore, Moscow will not be helped by possible attempts to influence Ukraine through various international organizations, the UN included.

In general, these circumstances may push Russia to take a more realistic position in determining the terms of negotiations with Ukraine. In particular, this may concern Moscow’s consent to the exchange of territories with Ukraine. However, V. Putin will still try to change the situation in his favor and regain control of Kursk region.

Nevertheless, this will require Russia to attract significant additional resources, including by announcing a general mobilization of human resources and the economy. In turn, such steps will create preconditions for a political and economic crisis in the Russian Federation. Especially, in the context of lack of financial reserves, which may run out in less than a year.