If on the stage there hangs a gun, it must fire

Victor Petrov

On the eve of the May Day, our media and social networks are full of reports on the next “betrayal”. Some sources disseminate official information of law enforcement agencies on detecting a significant number of weapons and ammunition in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions “during the conduct of procedural control in criminal investigation”. Others — openly mock official statements, justifying their position with the fact that arms and ammunition are controlled by the 3^rd Special Forces Regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and that they originate from the 5^th Battalion of the Ukrainian Voluntary Army (hereinafter — UDA).

We do not think that it is worth arguing with the so-called yellow press about this, I mean, “circling” with it around another “sensation”. Few people pays attention to the arguments of law enforcement officers, where the focus is not on the fact of the detection of weapons and military equipment, but on the need to establish the origin of these weapons and persons responsible for it. But the event itself touches upon at least two issues that have not yet been addressed.

First — existence of prerequisites for the uncontrolled/illegal trafficking of weapons and ammunition within the territory of the state (not in the context of the specific event, but in general in Ukraine).

Second — de facto reminding that, since 2014, voluntary formations (meaning those that existed outside the structures of the state’s military formations and law enforcement agencies) have been formed in Ukraine and actively involved in the hostilities in the Anti-Terrorist Operation [ATO] zone.

Regarding the first issue, I state briefly: if in the first act of the performance on the stage there hangs a gun, by the end of the play it must fire. Analysis of publications in the media and social networks shows that few people wondered why weapons and military equipment (not light armor, but first of all infantry fighting vehicle, armored personnel carrier, anti-tank gun, mortars, anti-tank missile systems (by the way, the latter — in large numbers) were used by the unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine only in the sixth year of the war. If they were previously captured by UDA units in battles with the Russian aggressor, this is one thing. If they have a different “history” of origin, it is logical to find out their origin. Putin’s “military surplus store” [voyentorg] “operates” only in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. I know no legal way of acquiring combatant heavy weapons in the territory of a belligerent country (and with the current lack of it in the troops). If sources of “leakage” of weapons and their circulation outside the legal field do exist, are there any guarantees that they will not be used by anti-Ukrainian forces or even criminals? And did some or other officials not violate the rules of accounting and storing the weapons in specified places?

It is no coincidence that from the very beginning of the Anti-Terrorist Operation, the society kept accusing “security forces” of inadequate control over weapons and ammunition. And, in fact, their illegal trafficking in the country, where the situation is unstable, is a powerful risk factor. I do not think that there will be many Ukrainian citizens who like the idea of allowing one or another oligarch to keep their own “pocket” army, let alone with heavy weapons. Therefore, in this context, the interest of law enforcement agencies to the aforementioned events is quite reasonable and even obligatory.

Although, in the context of such an event, I wonder even more about the history, current state and perspective of voluntary units. Everyday events in Ukraine have unduly sheltered our not so long-standing history of the Russian aggression (which, by the way, is not over yet). Volunteer units became active participants in the hottest battles. The author of these lines knows about this not by hearsay, because he had frequent contacts with volunteers in the ATO zone. He established many long-lasting and strong relationships with many of them. The contribution of volunteers to the successful countering the aggressor is beyond doubt. The problems that have always plagued them are also unforgettable — some of the apology for senior commanders’ refusal to accept their existence, more than modest resources which they had to get by right or wrong, lack of formal status and the associated “inconveniences”, etc. But when the “hot phase” of events in the Donbas became less noticeable, the topic gradually fell out of the “top news”, although the problems of volunteers themselves have not sorted themselves out.

I will open a little secret. In 2015–2016, our “security forces” very narrowly missed resolving the problem by integrating volunteer units into army organizational structures. I emphasize: not individual participants of voluntary units who voluntarily went to military service under contract, but entire units formed as teams that actually had their leaders, history of existence and traditions. In the media archives you can find the Ministry of Defense press service’s materials about official meetings of the General Staff with UDA leaders, at which the parties almost agreed on such decisions. They even started drafting personnel documents and other required documents. This was beneficial to everyone, because the army was replenished with highly motivated combatants in already formed units with combat experience, volunteers began to operate within the legal field (sorry, but in a civilized country where weapons are used, it cant be otherwise) and have the necessary protection and support from the state.

But the project “did not take off”.

The reasons are probably not one or two. Some are just anybody’s guess. But perhaps one of the main ones was probably the subjective desire of military leaders not to leave the “comfort zone”. The soldiers from the volunteer units did not fit into the commander’s stereotypes of the perception of the “average contract soldier”, let alone of the mobilized soldier from the battalion of territorial defense.

To fight shoulder to shoulder with volunteers is easy and safe. But when the bullets are not whistling, it is sometimes difficult to communicate with the volunteers, because they raise, so to speak, “uncomfortable” questions, etc. My friend, who at one time served as one of the deputy commanders of the Anti-Terrorist Operation, could compare ordinary units and volunteers, as he often visited them (for example, the “Donbas” Battalion, which held defense in the village of Shirokine in those days). During the communication with the military, questions were raised mainly on domestic topics (food and material support, obtaining the status of a participant in combat operations, benefits, etc.). While the officers of the “Donbas” Battalion were interested only in “combat issues” — from specifying the location for the best deployment of the checkpoint to the removal of the ban on the use of additional powder charges for mortar or getting a non-broken scope for the machine gun. At this — no complaints about the above-mentioned domestic topics, although all units in the ATO zone had approximately the same conditions. But even this simple comparison shows some difference in worldviews and attitudes to the armed defense of the state.

The war against Ukraine is not over yet. Today, they are trying to find correct solutions for the effective territorial defense of the state and organization of resistance movement in the temporarily occupied territories in case of large-scale aggression. Among the urgent tasks is the military-patriotic education of the youth… So far, everyone has got the illusion that such issues are simply solved by administrative measures, such as the formation of units of territorial defense by military commissariats. But this is obviously not enough. Without motivated and educated people, the system of territorial defense, and especially the resistance movement, will not work. The reserve for the success of such projects may be the maximum involvement of the current and former volunteers (or even their teams on a territorial or other principle) in improving the efficiency of the defense of the state.

After all, if a person is patriotically minded, has the warfare experience and a strong motivation to actively defend the state, it is likely that without additional invitations or privileges he will take up arms. Provided that officials do not minimize this motivation…

Surprisingly, for some reason our state still ignores such unused defense reserves. The author of these lines does not want the volunteers to be mentioned only in the context of criminal cases about the arms trafficking…