The Danger of an Enemy Attack in the North-East of Ukraine

Where Can Russia Strike?

Ivan Sichen

Lately, there have been various reports and estimates regarding the preparation of Russia’s new large-scale offensive against Ukraine, which is said to possibly begin as early as May-June 2024. It’s claimed that the goal of such a Russian offensive is to capture Kharkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and even Odesa with Kyiv. In many cases, such assessments are diametrically opposite in their content. Some claim that Russia is preparing for a new large-scale offensive. Others state that it is the Russian information campaign aimed at provoking panic in Ukraine and withdrawing Ukrainian troops from active sectors of the front line. The uncertainty of the situation puts the military and political leadership of Ukraine before an extremely difficult choice: where to send additional troops, how to build defenses or conduct a counteroffensive. The further course of the war and its results will depend on the correctness of decisions made.

With the beginning of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014, a group of Ukrainian parliamentarians released some documents regarding the Kremlin’s strategic plans for our country. Among them there was a map with the plan of the offensive operation of the Russian troops to capture the entire left-bank and the south of Ukraine. At that time, many did not believe in such intentions of the Russian Federation, as well as in the fact that it provoked the conflict in the Donbas, and later directly intervened in the conflict with its regular troops. Back then, the Kremlin failed to fully implement the above-mentioned plans, which were hindered by rapid restoration of Ukraine’s military potential, as well as Russia’s lack of the necessary forces and means for a large-scale offensive. Therefore, Russia limited itself only to the occupation of Crimea and part of the Donbas, but it did not abandon its goals regarding the full occupation of Ukraine.

The next attempt was the full-scale war launched by Russia against Ukraine in February 2022. Once again, the Kremlin overestimated its capabilities and underestimated Ukraine’s ability to resist the aggressor. Therefore, Russia was forced to withdraw its troops from the north of Ukraine, and later from most of Kharkiv region and the entire right-bank territory in the south of our country.

The Kremlin drew conclusions from its mistakes and in the autumn of 2022 changed its plans for the occupation of Ukraine. In Russia, a partial mobilization was announced, the recruitment of contract servicemen increased, measures were initiated to put the Russian economy on a “war footing”. Thanks to the measures taken, Russia managed to concentrate a much more powerful group of troops at the front in Ukraine than at the beginning of a full-scale war. According to different estimates, there are currently 490,000 to 620,000 Russian military at the front in Ukraine, who are quite well trained and provided with a significant amount of military equipment. Thanks to this, Russia managed to seize the initiative at the front, disrupt Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023 and resume its offensive.

Currently, the Russian Federation still does not have enough forces to simultaneously conduct several offensive operations to capture large cities in the north, east and south of Ukraine. Especially since a large number of defense lines and engineering fortifications are finally being built in Ukraine. Because of this, the Russian troops are forced to limit themselves only to tactical offensive actions in several sections of the front line. However, with the help of the troops that are already deployed in Ukraine and around it, and are also in the process of formation, Russia can concentrate a powerful group for an offensive operation in the direction of one of the Ukrainian cities.

First of all, Kharkiv, which is located some 30 km from the Russian border, is under threat. This city is important for Russia as the “second capital” of Ukraine, a political and industrial center, as well as an important transport hub. Having captured Kharkiv and Kharkiv region, the Kremlin would be able to claim a “decisive success” in the war against Ukraine. Not to mention the fact that the loss of such a large city would be a powerful factor in undermining the morale of Ukrainian society and would lead to an influx of refugees, which would contribute to the destabilization of the situation in our country.

Some other large Ukrainian cities are also under the threat of a Russian attack. However, Kherson and Odesa are protected by the Dnipro River, which Russian troops would not be able to quickly cross. Also, in case of an offensive, the provision of logistics for the advancing troops would become a significant problem. In 2022, it was logistical problems that forced the Russian troops to leave the right bank of Ukraine and Kherson.

Kyiv is separated from Belarus by the Pripyat River and the forest-marsh area of Polissia. There are only a few bridges and roads that are relatively easy to block. Besides, their capacity is not enough for the passage of a significant number of troops and transportation of the necessary supplies. This fact was once again confirmed by the situation in the spring of 2022, when there were huge traffic jams of transport vehicles of the Russian army north of Kyiv.

The Ukrainian cities of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy and Chernihiv are in a different position. Not far from Zaporizhzhia is the southern front in Ukraine, and most of the city is located on the left bank of the Dnipro River, which limits its defense capabilities. The city of Dnipro is located on the right bank and is further from the front line. At the same time, it may also be in danger in case of the enemy’s breakthrough on the eastern front. But both in the east and in the south, Ukrainian troops firmly hold their positions, preventing the enemy from entering the operational space.

Like Kharkiv, Sumy also borders on Russia, or more precisely, on its Kursk region. However, the wooded area and the low capacity of the roads make offensive actions difficult and defense easier. The same can be said about Chernihiv, which is located not far from Belarus and Bryansk region of the Russian Federation. To date, no strike groups of Russian troops have been observed either in Kursk or Bryansk regions, or in Belarus itself.

Therefore, the most likely target of Russia’s new large-scale offensive may be Kharkiv. In order to increase the effectiveness of the offensive, it can take place in two directions — from the east and from the north.

In the east, in the occupied part of Kharkiv region and in Luhansk region, a powerful group of Russian troops has already been created and is actively operating, albeit at the tactical level. At this stage, its main task is to cross the Oskil River and capture Kupiansk.

In the north, in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk regions of the Russian Federation, the Russians currently have only troops covering the border with Ukraine, as well as permanent deployment points for units and forces that were deployed there before the war, and now most of them are at the front in Ukraine. Elements of the headquarters, some units (mainly staffed by conscripts), warehouses and other rear facilities remain in the permanent deployment points. There also are training grounds and field camps, where the training of contract servicemen continues. Russia uses these forces both to cover the border and to maintain tensions in the north and northeast of Ukraine in order to bind additional forces of Ukrainian troops. However, these forces are not enough for a large-scale offensive on Ukraine.

However, come the need, Russia can quite quickly transfer an additional number of troops to the areas along the border with Ukraine. Moreover, today there are some classic signs of possible preparation of Russian troops for a new attack on Ukraine from the north-eastern direction. Let’s consider them in more detail.

Firstly, the Kremlin has clearly defined the excuse for such an offensive and its purpose. The top state leadership of the Russian Federation declared the need to create a “buffer zone in order to prevent shelling of Russia’s border regions from the territory of Ukraine”. At the same time, the emphasis was once again on Kharkiv and Kharkiv region, although it is clear to everyone that the real goal of Russia is further occupation of Ukraine.

Secondly, a single command system of Russian troops in the Russian regions bordering on Ukraine has been created, which are united in a single organizational structure of the army-front level. Thus, on the basis of the border protection groups “Belgorod”, “Kursk” and “Bryansk”, the group “North” has been formed under a single command.

Thirdly, the number of Russian troops on the border with Ukraine is increasing. So far, this process is small in scope and includes the transfer of some military units from other Russian regions there. Due to this, lately, the number of troops of the “North” group has increased from 46,000 to about 50,000 servicemen. New forces that are currently being formed in the Russian army also may be transferred there.

Fourthly, in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk regions of the Russian Federation, the air defense system has been significantly strengthened. This is quite logical due to the intensity of Ukraine’s airstrikes against military, oil and military facilities of the Russian Federation. However, strengthening of the air defense system also always takes place in areas where the deployment of troops is planned or carried out.

Fifthly, the administration of Belgorod region has created a headquarters to coordinate the processes of transportation, unloading and supply of fuel. The development and improvement of the logistics system is also a mandatory measure before the deployment of additional troops. Military logistics can also use local civil authorities and organizations with their infrastructure.

Sixthly, in the regions of the Russian Federation neighboring Ukraine, the hospital base is being urgently expanded. New hospitals are being built, civilian medical facilities are being repurposed. The main emphasis is on surgery and traumatology. For the needs of the military, even maternity homes are being used, and pregnant women are being transferred to other medical facilities.

Seventhly, from May 2024, restriction on the sale of alcohol is being introduced in the areas of Belgorod region adjacent to Ukraine, where the forward echelon of the Russian strike group may be stationed. As you know, drunkenness is a critical problem for the Russian army, therefore, in the conditions of a possible intensification of military operations, they are trying to struggle against it.

All this is accompanied by strengthening of the police regime in the Russian Federation, the fight with anti-war sentiments, as well as “cleansing” in administrations of the border regions of the Russian Federation, which is usually carried out on the eve of offensive actions.

In general, the above-mentioned developments indicate a high level of threat of the Russia’s new offensive in the north-east of Ukraine. At this, the main blow can be inflicted on Kharkiv, and auxiliary ones — on Sumy and Chernihiv.

The Kremlin’s decision on this issue will depend on a number of factors, primarily the availability of the necessary forces and means to carry out an offensive, as well as Ukraine’s ability to resist the aggressor. An immediate sign of the Kremlin’s decision on a new offensive will be the deployment of a strike group of Russian troops in Belgorod region, as well as the strengthening of existing troops in Bryansk and Kursk regions of the Russian Federation.

So far, the offensive potential of the Russian Federation is limited due to the lack of personnel, most of which are already involved in hostilities at the front in Ukraine. The additional conscription into the Russian army and the available volumes of arms supply allow only to compensate for the losses at the front. However, the Kremlin can increase its troops by expanding the scope of open or covert mobilization. Military units (including newly formed ones) from other regions of the Russian Federation, as well as from relatively inactive areas of the front in Ukraine, can also be redeployed to the Russian regions bordering on Ukraine.

Therefore, the construction of defensive fortifications near Kharkiv and on other parts of the north-eastern border of Ukraine with Russia and Belarus was an absolutely right step of the Ukrainian leadership, which, unfortunately, was not done on the eve of the full-scale war. The construction of new fortification lines requires significant financial expenses from the state budget. Besides, the new defensive fortifications should be occupied, at least, by cover units, which will really bind the forces of the Ukrainian troops. However, such measures are a forced necessity, and neglecting them would have extremely difficult consequences for Ukraine.

Anyway, the Russian Federation will continue to inflict systematic strikes on both Kharkiv and other cities of Ukraine with the aim of destroying their infrastructure, demoralizing the population and undermining the morale of Ukrainian society. It is clear that this can be countered only by strengthening the air defense system of our country and increasing the effectiveness of counter-battery fire against the enemy’s missile and artillery means in the border areas of the Russian Federation.