State Terrorism at the Core of the Kremlin Policy

Implications of the terrorist attack in “Crocus City Hall”

Ivan Sichen

Every time after the presidential elections in the Russian Federation, the Kremlin leadership, as a rule, strengthens the totalitarian regime in the country. Currently, for the Putin regime, the additional “tightening of the nuts” is needed due to the complication of the internal situation in the Russian Federation over the prolongation of the war against Ukraine and strengthening of its negative consequences for the aggressor himself. At this, Moscow’s methods of action do not actually change, and are based on provocations and terrorist acts against both its own population and citizens of other countries. Besides, the Kremlin does not worry about the number of victims among civilians, not to mention the destroyed civilian infrastructure.

A similar practice is characteristic of all totalitarian regimes, including the current one in Russia. But most of them do try to refrain from terrorist activities in order to maintain at least some legitimacy. However, this is of no importance to the Kremlin, because after the outbreak of Russian-Ukrainian war and all the committed atrocities and war crimes, the Putin regime cannot be discredited more. That is why Moscow again began to strike at the energy infrastructure of Ukraine, and also organized or at least allowed the mass slaughter of Russian citizens in the concert center “Crocus City Hall” in the suburbs of Moscow on March 22, 2024.

The strategy and tactics of provocative and terrorist activities of the Russian authorities to achieve their political goals are well known to everyone. More than one book could be written (and a lot has already been written) about them. Therefore, let’s pay attention to just a few of the most revealing facts with a historical retrospective.

For example, in order to have a justification for the attack on Finland, on November 26, 1939, Soviet special services organized the so-called Mainila incident, namely, they fired at the Soviet border post on the Karelian Isthmus. A special unit of the NKVD fired seven shells from a cannon. Four Soviet servicemen were killed, nine more were wounded.

The USSR immediately blamed Finland for the shelling and launched a war against it. At this, Finland was accused of anti-Soviet and anti-communist policy (at that time — the Kremlin’s analogue of the current term “Nazism in Ukraine”), as well as planning an attack on the Soviet Union. Although, the main goal of the USSR attack was to destroy Finland as an independent state and to establish Soviet power over the entire Finnish territory.

To achieve this goal, in the spring and summer of 1939, a partial mobilization was carried out in the USSR and a strike group of troops was deployed near the Finnish border. In order to justify the “legitimacy” of the aggression, a new “Finnish government” was formed in the Soviet Union, which, with the start of hostilities, asked Moscow for military assistance.

Due to the passivity of the West at that time, which actually refused to help the Finns and even forced them to surrender to the USSR under the guise of peace negotiations, Finland lost part of its territories, including the city of Viipuri (Vyborg). Today, as you know, Finland has already joined NATO. Therefore, it is quite possible that the city of Viipuri, together with other Finnish territories captured by Russia, will return to Finland.

The USSR’s military invasion of Poland in September 1939, immediately after the attack on it by Hitler’s Germany, was also provocative in nature. As in the case of the attack on Ukraine in 2022, Moscow justified its actions with the “need to protect the Ukrainian population”. In fact, the Russian occupation of that time turned into mass repressions, deportations and mobilization to the Soviet Army for the mentioned population. That is why the inhabitants of Western Ukraine rejoiced at the arrival of the Germans in 1941. And then the most conscious and active Ukrainians joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought against the Soviets to the end of the 1950s. And now it has recovered and is again participating in the war against the current Russian Federation.

With the beginning of disintegration processes in the USSR in the late 1980s, Moscow provoked armed conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to keep them (then — still Soviet republics) under its control. How exactly this was done was discussed in our previous articles. We will just remind that the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan has already been resolved, and the self-proclaimed “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” has been effectively liquidated. The same fate awaits the self-proclaimed “Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic” (PMR) on the territory of Moldova. Especially after the “authorities” of the illegal entity raised the issue of joining the Russian Federation, and therefore became a legitimate target for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. There are no problems with eliminating it altogether. There are two Russian battalions there, consisting of local residents, and the entire “army of the PMR” consists of only four battalions, which they ambitiously call “brigades”.

With Vladimir Putin’s coming to power in the Russian Federation, the Kremlin’s practice of state terrorism gained a special scope. Moreover, it was the provocation of the Second Chechen War in 1999 that became the main instrument of the controlled transfer of the power from the then President of the country, Boris Yeltsin, who had completely lost his authority. Under such circumstances, fair presidential elections in Russia would not have given Putin, who was Prime Minister in the Yeltsin government, any chance of victory.

He was not able to quickly achieve positive changes in the Russian economy and improve the standard of living of the population, especially after the default and financial crisis of 1998. Therefore, the only way to improve Putin’s rating was to conduct a small victorious war in the form of “repulsing an attack on Russia”. And since no one was actually going to attack the Russian Federation, the attack had to be organized somehow. This was done by the Russian FSB in the form of several terrorist attacks, namely, the blowing up of residential buildings in Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September 1999. 307 people died, 1.7 thousand civilians were injured. Another explosion of a residential building was supposed to take place in the city of Ryazan, but it was thwarted by its residents together with the local police. Some FSB operatives were detained in Ryazan, which clearly indicated who was actually the organizer of such terrorist attacks.

However, the Russian leadership and the Kremlin propaganda blamed “Chechen Islamists” for the terrorist attacks. The information campaign of the need for strengthening the countering of Islamism and extremism, as well as liquidation of the independent Republic of Ichkeria (Chechnya), which was pointed to as its main source, immediately began. And in order to create a justification for the war, in October 1999, a group of Chechen fighters controlled by Moscow attacked Dagestan.

Subsequently, Chechen clans controlled by Moscow surrendered their positions at the front and in the city of Grozny, which enabled Russia to seize the territory of the independent Chechen republic relatively quickly. On the wave of euphoria from the victory and “Pobedobesie” (victory obsession), Vladimir Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation. And no one mentioned that about 180,000 Russian citizens, including civilians, had paid for this with their lives. And Islamic extremism was given a new and powerful impetus — “What Goes Around… Comes Around”.

During the First Chechen War, several powerful terrorist attacks took place in the Moscow Metro. The first was in June 1996 on the run between Tulskaya and Naginskaya stations. Four people died, 12 more were injured. The second was in August 2000 at Pushkinskaya station. 13 people were killed and 118 were injured. The third was in February 2004 between Avtozavodskaya and Paveletskaya stations. 41 people died, 250 were injured. The fourth was in August 2004 at Rizhskaya station. Several dozen passengers died and more than 40 were injured. The fifth was in March 2010 at Lubyanka and Park Kultury stations. 39 people died, 70 were hospitalized. And in April 2017, a terrorist attack occurred in the St. Petersburg Metro on the run between Technological Institute and Sennaya Ploshchad stations. 14 people died, more than 50 were injured. The terrorist attack was timed to Putin’s visit to St. Petersburg.

At the same time, Islamic extremists carried out a series of terrorist actions on Russian railway transport. In particular, in December 2003, during the morning rush hour in the North Caucasus of the Russian Federation, a carriage on a suburban train was blown up. At least 50 people died, several tens were injured. The explosion happened a few days before the parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation. And at the end of November 2009, due to the detonation of a mine, the Nevsky Express train, which connects Moscow and St. Petersburg, derailed. About 30 people died. In December 2013, an explosive device was detonated at the central railway station of Volgograd. 18 people were killed.

The scope of terrorists’ activities also extended to airplanes and airports. In August 2004, suicide bombers simultaneously blew up two passenger planes, killing 90 passengers. One of the planes was heading to Sochi, the other to Volgograd. And that’s not all. In January 2011, a suicide bomber carried out a terrorist attack in the arrivals area of the Moscow Domodedovo Airport. 37 people died, 170 were injured. After the terrorist attack, security regulations were tightened at all Russian airports. Metal detectors at the entrance to passenger terminals became mandatory, including for regional air terminals. Given the increased security measures at train stations and airports, terrorists switched to public transport. In December 2013, more than 30 people died as a result of two terrorist attacks on a trolleybus and a bus in the city of Volgograd.

The recent attack in the concert center “Crocus City Hall” in the suburbs of Moscow also had its history. Back in October 2002, a group of terrorists seized the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, where the premiere of the musical “Nord-Ost” was taking place. More than 900 people were taken hostage. The militants demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. Of course, this demand was not fulfilled, and the building of the theater was stormed with the use of poisonous gas. Most of the hostages — about 130 people in total — died from it.

Despite the fact that all the terrorists in the Dubrovka Theater were liquidated, their associates continued their cause. On September 1, 2004, they seized a school in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia. The same demands were made for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and recognition of its independence, and more than a thousand people, mostly children, were taken hostage. The parents of the schoolchildren demanded that the authorities refrain from forceful actions and resolve the problem through negotiations. But no one listened to them. The school was stormed, resulting in the death of 334 people, 186 children included.

It is difficult to tell whether all these terrorist attacks were carried out by Islamist terrorists or Chechen patriots, or whether they were organized by Russian special services. The latter was probably done in Beslan. To begin with, the militants there were commanded by a militia captain, the chief of the criminal investigation department of the neighboring district. A third of the attackers were active militia officers, a third were criminals who should have been in prisons, and another third were who knows who. Most of them managed to escape after the terrorist attack.

All these terrorist attacks, in one way or another, were used by Vladimir Putin to strengthen his power. Each of them became a reason for the additional measures to limit democracy in the country. To the greatest extent, they unfolded after the tragedy in Beslan, when Putin announced large-scale political reforms in the Russian Federation. The direct elections of governors were canceled, a special federal commission for the North Caucasus was created, the president of North Ossetia Aleksandr Dzasokhov was dismissed, and the National Antiterrorism Committee of the Russian Federation was created.

In a similar way, the Kremlin uses the terrorist attack in “Crocus City Hall”. Thus, Putin has already accused Ukraine of involvement in the terrorist attack, with the aim of providing additional justification for the war against our state, as well as discrediting it on the international stage. Now it is extremely important for Moscow due to the actual loss of the offensive potential of the Russian troops after achieving only limited tactical successes at the front, as well as the gradual restoration of powerful military assistance to Ukraine from Europe and the United States.

Such trends lead to a prolongation of the Putin’s war against Ukraine and increasingly negative consequences for the Russian Federation itself. The aggravation of socio-economic problems in the country and the growth of anti-war sentiments among the Russian population increase the probability of mass protests against the Putin regime, as happened in 2012 due to the Kremlin’s falsification of the presidential election.

Besides, Moscow seeks to strengthen its international position by establishing cooperation with other countries based on the joint fight against terrorism. However, only Tajikistan and Uzbekistan enter such negotiations with it.

And finally, there have been rumors for a long time that general mobilization should be announced in the Russian Federation after the presidential election. Moscow denies having such plans, but at least it will be forced to expand the scale of partial mobilization, as it clearly lacks reserves. Not only at the front, but also in other areas important to it, in particular, for the formation of new units in the restored Moscow and Leningrad military districts. In this regard, the recent terrorist attack appears to be the best opportunity to justify an additional call to the army and other security forces.

Concluding my article, I would like to point out that Russia will in any case continue to carry out terrorist attacks on the civilian infrastructure and peaceful population of Ukraine, because it is not capable of doing anything else. But the terrorist attack in “Crocus City Hall” can probably become a “trigger” for another wave of terrorism in the Russian Federation, as it happened in 2000–2010. Therefore, there will be new seizures of various shopping centers, schools, and even villages and towns, as it happened in Budyonnovsk in 1995. It seems that the measures taken by the Russian authorities to strengthen the fight against terrorism are nothing more than a fiction and a show. And as shown by the experience of the current war, in particular, by the actions of the Russian insurgents to liberate the border territories of Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod regions, Moscow will continue to resort to the practice of total destruction of the settlements along with Russian population and hostages.