George Woloshyn
“…No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor, dumb bastard die for his country.”
General George Patton (movie line)
When considering the “capability” of a nation’s armed forces it is not enough to simply look at the numbers. They can be misleading in showing merely the size of the forces that may be brought into play but not how well they comport themselves in battle. History is replete with examples of major powers losing or simply walking away from battlefields in which they enjoyed overwhelming statistical advantage, but failed to win because of poor leadership, poor training, inadequate logistical support, terrain, morale, or any of dozens of factors that do not show up in mere numbers. Perhaps the best example of this in the last century was the USSR’s loss to tiny Finland in the 1939 “winter war” and America’s hasty exit from Vietnam.
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…According to Global Fire Power, Russia ranks 2nd and Ukraine — 22nd in the world from among 140 countries. Does that mean that Ukraine will loose against Russia? No… not necessarily… |
But let’s start with numbers. The web-site Global Fire Power ranks countries according to their known and estimated aggregates of military personnel and inventories related to conventional capabilities. Ukraine is ranked 22nd in the world from among 140 countries while Russia ranks 2nd. Ukraine is shown as having a total of 500,000 active, reserve, and paramilitary personnel while Russia is shown as having 1,350,000 including 850,000 active, 250,000 reserve, and 250,000 paramilitary. Ukraine’s Air Force has 318 aircraft while Russia’s has 14 times that many — 4,173. Ukraine’s Navy has 38 ships while Russia’s has 16 times that many — 605. Ukraine has 2,596 tanks while Russia has 5 times as many — 12,420. Ukraine has 3,107 artillery pieces while Russia has 4.5 times as many — 14,145. As is obvious, Ukrainian forces are badly outgunned and outmanned by any standard of military parity. But it should be noted that, in case of an invasion, all of Ukraine’s ordnance and personnel can be brought into play, while Russia would have to leave most of its equipment and personnel behind.
Does that mean that Ukraine will loose against Russia? No… not necessarily. A stale-mate, followed by a cease-fire, and a Russian exit is very possible depending on how effectively each fights the war. Let’s look at some of Russia’s strengths and — more importantly — its military short-falls to gauge how well its forces will comport themselves.
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…Russia received a “wake-up” call in 2008 when its leaders saw how poorly their forces performed against the tiny Georgian nation… |
Russia received a “wake-up” call in 2008 when its leaders saw how poorly their forces performed against the tiny Georgian nation. In the course of a decade Putin’s “New Look” reform program reorganized and rearmed his military so that it has become a smaller but more professional, and better trained and equipped swift-reaction force with some combat zone experience in Ukraine and Syria. Personnel costs have risen from $4 billion in 2000 to $30 billion in 12 years, but both its effectiveness and capacity has been much improved.
The other half of Russia’s $60–65 billion defense budget has been invested in modernizing and adding enhancement to existing Soviet-design weapon systems left over from the Cold War, such as tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, rocket projectors, and aircraft. Very little has been available for design and development of new armaments to keep pace with advancing technology, but in certain “niche” sectors, such as electronic warfare and battlefield cyber and communications Russians may have moved ahead of the U.S.
A review of Russia’s reorganization and rearmament program as well as defense budget priorities shows that Russia sees its strategic nuclear arsenal as its ultimate guarantor, while its conventional forces are expected to be highly mobile, and increasingly capable of conducting short but complex and intense, high-tempo (“shock and awe”) operations spearheaded by elite airborne troops. Their experience in Ukraine confirmed the value of massed artillery, rocket fire and armored forces. They have neither the strength nor depth to sustain a war of attrition against the U.S. or NATO, but are capable of gaining a limited objective and “digging in.”
1. Manpower. Detailed manpower information is classified, so we must rely on widely divergent estimates to determine the breakdown among professional (contract) personnel, conscripts, reserves, and paramilitary. These numbers matter because the quality, training, purpose and motivation of each of these categories are significantly different, as is the cost to the government. Russia’s goal (which has fallen short by more than 10 %) is for a one million active duty force.
Contract personnel are the professional core on which Russia’s Armed Forces depends. Its 2011–2020 strategic plan called for 500,000 contract soldiers by 2020 but enrolled only 410,000. The goal has been reduced to 475,000 by 2025. An estimated 75 % of the 65,000 spetsnaz and airborne troops are in this category. Recruitment has lagged because of demographic and financial issues and most of the increased manpower costs are due to their salaries and benefits.
Conscripts, on the other hand, serve 1-year terms and backfill secondary positions, but are utilized for no more than 5–6 months after 6-month training. Poor conditions, very low pay, and severe hazing have discouraged enlistment. If the number of estimated active duty personnel is listed at 850,000 than we can conclude that more than 40 % of those positions are filled by less capable and effective conscripts.
Reserves is another one of those categories that varies widely in numbers and is susceptible to manipulation… from 250,000 to 900,000. Reservists are predominantly former conscripts of which less than 10 % attend refresher training in the 5 years after leaving service. The budgeted amounts allocated for reservists have been low and the tracking system inadequate to do more than summon a small fraction of this manpower pool. Hence, analysts are prone to distinguish between “operational” or “functional” reserve in contrast with the “potential” reserve size.
Paramilitary include a variety of personnel such as Territorial Defense, National Guard, police, that could be mobilized in an emergency but would have a very limited role in an offensive war.
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…Russia has not increased its capabilities as much as it portrayed in the media… |
2. Weapon systems. Just like manpower numbers that should be viewed with caution, so must Russia’s announced levels of modernization. Many announced armament programs have fallen short of their targets and Russia has delayed or down-sized procurement. For example, in its 2011–2020 program, Russia touted the introduction of 2300 new Armata main battle tanks and 55 new Su-57 combat aircraft by 2020. However, the few Armata tanks and Su-57 aircraft actually produced were prototype and pre-production versions. Russia has not increased its capabilities as much as it portrayed in the media.
3. Logistics. As stated earlier, Putin’s armed forces have the combat power to capture an objective in a short time frame, dig in, and deny access in defending against a counterattack. But they do not have the logistic forces and transport capability needed to do it in a single push without a logistical pause to reset its sustainment infrastructure. Because of extra artillery and air defense battalions, Russian logistic requirements are higher than those of the U.S. They would have difficulty sustaining a ground offensive over large distances.
Conclusions And Recommendations
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…There always has been some puffery in Russia’s representations of its military might… |
1. There always has been some puffery in Russia’s representations of its military might. Its reserve forces are poorly prepared, require time to locate and mobilize, and may not share Putin’s enthusiasm for war; while its active duty forces have a large component of relatively inexperienced conscripts, who may be counting down remaining service time and have little or no exposure to combat. In fact, some may even be non-Russian and “mistake” the colors of the emblems. The bottom line is that Ukrainian forces — at the outset — may be facing as many as 100,000 (one quarter?) of Russia’s “finest” but who come prepared with such an array of firepower as to shake the earth.
For those who spent some time in the trenches of Donbas, the tanks, rockets, armored vehicles and artillery will be familiar. They are the same, though Russia’s may be more accurate, have a longer range, and fire more “precision” projectiles. The remedy is also the same: dispersal and cover. Ukraine now possesses many anti-tank missiles that are really effective. They may not always destroy armored vehicles but they will disable them.
2. The towns and cities are Putin’s greatest risks. They always favor the defenders. The defender is familiar with their lay-out, has access to food, water, ammo, and medical supplies, and will spot the enemy before he spots the defender. Night vision scopes are necessary because that’s when the enemy will try to infiltrate.
3. The invader’s long logistical “tail” is the defender’s “sweet spot.” Cargo-carrying trucks provide soft targets and can be taken out with a simple grenade. If the enemy can not resupply his fireworks, he may as well go home.
4. The best defense against aircraft is to stay under cover by day and move at night, preferably in civilian vehicles.
5. The invasion is as much an info-war as a hot war. Cameras should be available and lots of videos needed for global dissemination and subsequent prosecution in international courts.
