The Situation on the Front Line and Mobilization in Russia

Even a general mobilization will not help Russia radically change the course of the war

Ivan Sichen

Despite the relatively slow pace of the counteroffensive of Ukrainian troops, they are yielding results. For one, we managed to push back the enemy in a number of sections of the front line and hold it back in others. In its turn, Russia has actually lost the potential accumulated since the autumn of last year during partial mobilization, and no longer has significant reserves. In view of this, both open (partial) and covert mobilization, which is carried out in various forms, continues in the Russian Federation. So far, it remains on a limited scale, but it is highly likely to take on a general character in case of Russia’s critical failures at the front. The reason for such a decision may be the breakthrough of the defense of Russian troops in the south of Ukraine and the elimination of the land corridor of the Russian Federation with Crimea. However, the general mobilization in Russia will inevitably face significant problems, even greater than those that took place in 2022. This fact is actually recognized by the leaders of the Russian Federation, who are taking measures to prevent those problems. Such measures give certain results, but cannot radically change the situation. Therefore, Moscow will not be able to stop our counteroffensive.

As you know, since the beginning of the counteroffensive in June 2023, Ukrainian troops have managed to advance to the north and south of the city of Bakhmut, where a number of dominant heights were occupied, as well as the tactically important villages of Klishchiivka and Andriivka. The city is not even semi-encircled yet, but it is already close. At least, its western part is being targeted by Ukrainian artillery. The main transport communications, which are used by the enemy for the logistical support of its troops in Bakhmut, are also partially under our fire.

The pre-field have been overcome, and in some cases the strongest first line of defense of the enemy was broken through in the Melitopol and Berdyansk directions, where the villages of Robotino, Staromaiorske and Urozhaine were liberated. Currently, Ukrainian troops are expanding the breakthrough in the areas of the mentioned villages in order to prevent flank attacks by the enemy. After that, we will continue to move forward to the south. And soon the motorway and the railway connecting Rostov region of Russia with Crimea will also be under our fire.

Bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro in Kherson region have been captured. They are insignificant and there are few our forces there. Yet, problems have been created for the enemy. Besides, this enables landing of more powerful forces. We are better at this than the Russians, as shown by previous experience.

At the same time, Ukrainian troops are successfully countering the offensive of the aggressor’s superior troops on the Kupiansk, Lyman, Mariinka, and Avdiivka directions. All attempts by the Russians to break through the Ukrainian defenses have failed. The enemy only managed to expand the “gray” zone. However, Russia does not abandon its intentions to break through to the left bank of the River Oskol and gain a foothold on it, and, if possible, to capture the city of Kupiansk as an important transport hub. At the same time, the enemy continues to try to reach western borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, or at least to push Ukrainian troops away from the city of Donetsk. This is the main goal of the offensive actions of Russian troops in the above-mentioned directions.

On other sections of the front, Russia is trying to deter the offensive of Ukrainian troops, including by conducting local counterattacks. At this, the main efforts of the Russian invaders are aimed at holding the city of Bakhmut in their hands and preventing the breakthrough of Ukrainian troops in the south of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions and eliminating Russia’s land corridor to Crimea. But, Russia no longer has enough strength for all this. As we can see, the Russian military command keeps throwing military units from one section of the front to another. This practice in no way helps to resolve the problems of lack of reserves, because attempts to strengthen the defense of Russian troops in the south of Ukraine weaken it in the east of our country. In particular, in the first half of September 2023, Russia redeployed part of its forces from Bakhmut to Robotino and Staromaiorske — to the main directions of the offensive of Ukrainian troops in Zaporizhzhia region. Our troops immediately took an advantage of that and, managed to advance south of Bakhmut.

Under such circumstances, Moscow urgently gathers reserves inside Russia and sends them to the front. Thus, the new 25^th Army, which has not yet undergone the necessary training, is urgently deployed from the Far East to the Kupiansk direction. At the same time, this does not mean strengthening of the Russian troops in the east of Kharkiv region of Ukraine. From there, Russians are going to redeploy the 41^st Army, which has combat experience, although it has suffered significant losses, to the south of the Zaporizhzhia region. Therefore, Russia will definitely not succeed in the Kupiansk direction.

The only way for Russia to somehow remedy the situation in its favor is to expand the scale of conscription into the army. The leadership of the Russian Federation has so far denied the intention to conduct a new wave of mobilization. They speak only about the continuation of the planned recruitment of volunteers for contract service. In total, by the end of the year, 320 thousand contractors should be recruited. But, even this number of new servicemen, in fact, will only compensate for losses. Therefore, a new wave of mobilization in one form or another is virtually inevitable. And this is already being done in reality, in particular, by:

• forcing conscripts to sign contracts;
• sending law enforcement officers to the front, who are replaced by newly mobilized;
• transfer of soldiers of various kinds of semi-regular territorial formations to the active army;
• voluntary-compulsory conscription of prisoners in colonies, etc.

At the same time, in case of critical failures at the front, Moscow may announce a new wave of mobilization, including a general one. However, it will not be easy to carry it out in reality, which is recognized by the leadership of the Russian Federation. For one, most of those who consciously wanted to fight against Ukraine for one reason or another had long gone to the front and were mostly killed. According to the statements of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S. Shoigu, which were repeated by V. Putin, now 1.5 thousand “volunteers” are called up for contract service every day. However, everything that is said by both Russian propagandists and representatives of the ruling elite of the country is an outright lie, which also applies to the so-called volunteers. To confirm this conclusion, it is enough just to read Russia’s regional media. In particular, once a month, the regional military commissariat in Bryansk sends a group of volunteers who have entered contract service to training units. They are told good-by in a solemn atmosphere with the participation of the governor of the region, and the event itself is widely covered by the media. Judging by the photo, there are no more than fifteen people in the group of new contract soldiers. And this is for the whole city and region! Last year there were at least thirty or forty of them.

At this, conscription into the army in various forms has already led to a shortage of labor in Russia. There is a shortage of drivers, builders, workers of all major specialties at industrial enterprises and agricultural workers, especially tractor drivers. The continuation of recruitment for military service further complicates this problem, and in case of a general mobilization, it can become a real disaster and stop the work of the Russian economy.

The Kremlin and local authorities are trying to remedy the situation by purposeful inviting migrants from Central Asian countries to work in Russia. It is they who replace the Russians drafted into the army. Newcomers are given Russian citizenship and exempted, at least temporarily, from military service. They enjoy all the rights as the indigenous Russian population and remain in Russia for permanent residence.

This approach really makes it possible to form a powerful mobilization reserve at the expense of Russians, who can be replaced by migrants at their workplaces. All of the above-mentioned fully satisfies the leadership of the Russian Federation both in the center and on the ground. But immigrants from Central Asia also bring with them a number of significant threats to stability in Russia: the spread of Islamic extremism, the spread of drugs, interethnic and interreligious conflicts with the local population, and so on.

Nevertheless, Russia can still recruit people for military service, and in fairly large numbers. However, this does not resolve the issue of compensating for losses and building up the combat potential of the Russian army. An additional amount of weapons and military equipment, clothing, footwear and ammunition, food, medicine, etc., is needed. But there are not enough of them, as recognized by the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S. Shoigu. According to him, since the beginning of the “special military operation” in Ukraine, the military production in Russia has increased sevenfold. By the end of this year, this figure is planned to be doubled. It is planned to resume the production of tanks and artillery systems. But even according to the announced plans, the tanks that will be produced per month will be fewer than what is lost at the front. Therefore, according to various estimates, by the spring of next year, there will be no modern tanks left in Russia.

It is important that with each conscription or wave of mobilization, the quality of the contingent that comes to the army becomes worse and worse. This is an objective fact, since the physically healthy and fit for service were taken into the army in the first place. And now they are grabbing those who remain and prisoners who can only be used in the army as “cannon fodder”. Exactly what the Wagner PMC had been doing in Bakhmut, and what the Russian military command continues to do now.

Therefore, neither an additional recruitment of contract soldiers, nor even a general mobilization will help Russia radically change the course of the war. Of course, it will be able to continue it for some time, but it will still lose its position. One way or another, but in the near future, another significant victory of Ukrainian troops may be the elimination or, at least, disruption of the land corridor from Russia to Crimea.