Russia’s War Against Ukraine. Changes in the Aggressor’s Tactics

vraevski

Ivan Sichen

 

 

As you know, the leadership of the Russian Federation planned to complete the main phase of the so-called special operation against Ukraine within a maximum of three days, and in two weeks – to capture the entire Ukrainian territory. However, more than two weeks have passed but Moscow has not been able to implement its plans.

Moreover, the Russian-aggressive troops have largely lost their offensive potential, as a result of which the war in the main directions has turned into a protracted position-maneuver battles. While maintaining the overall strategic goals of Moscow, the new situation forces the aggressor to change the tactics of its actions. Such changes are of particular interest in order to organize adequate resistance to the enemy. Let’s try to analyze this issue.

 

Despite the actual failure of the Russian “blitzkrieg” in Ukraine, Moscow does not abandon the idea to continue the war against our state. As before, its primary goals include establishing control over Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Mariupol and Mykolayiv.

As shown by the experience of hostilities, it is almost impossible to achieve these goals with the forces available in Russia, but Moscow does not give up its plans. Only the tactics of the Russian troops are changing due to the ineffectiveness of the methods used at the beginning of the war and the emergence of a new situation at the front. Let’s analyze this question in more detail.

 

Thus, in the first days of the war, Russia’s methods of action were those of the classic “blitzkrieg”, and included:

  • attempts to destroy or disrupt Ukraine’s air defense by launching missile and bomb strikes at its key facilities;
  • capture of Ukrainian airfields in the main areas of the offensive of Russian troops by air assaults of special forces from helicopters. After that, the main forces of the airborne troops were landed to the airfields by military transport aircrafts;
  • airdrops of airborne troops in order to block the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as to ensure further deployment of Russian troops;
  • crossing the Ukrainian border by Russian troops in the directions of Kyiv and Chernihiv (from the north), Sumy and Kharkiv (from the east), Mariupol (from the southeast), Kherson (from the south). Breaking through checkpoints on the Ukrainian-Belarusian and Ukrainian-Russian borders, as well as blocking and destruction of Ukrainian border posts were carried out by special forces and with the support of artillery. Russian troops entered in large columns of battalion tactical groups, virtually one after another. The total length of the columns was several tens of kilometers;
  • establishing or attempting to establish control over cities and towns of Ukraine. At the initial stage, Russian troops tried to do so “on the go”. In particular, sabotage and reconnaissance groups, but in fact units of the Russian special forces, “cleared” the entrances to the settlements. Then they were followed by columns of armored vehicles and trucks with military personnel;
  • storming of key cities in the controlled by Ukraine territory in the conflict zone in the Donbas. In particular, on the first day, Russian troops began storming the cities of Mariupol and Volnovakha.

 

All these elements were practiced by the Russian armed forces during various military exercises. However, in practice their implementation faced a number of significant problems. Among them, the most difficult and completely unexpected for the Russian troops were:

  • maintaining the combat capability of the Air Force of Ukraine, including the air defense systems, fighter jets and front-line bombers. As a result, attempts to air drop and air assault Russian units using military transport aircrafts were thwarted (in particular, three Russian IL-76s were shot down). Besides, on the first or second day, the Armed Forces of Ukraine began successful operations to destroy enemy cruise missiles and aircrafts using heavy and portable anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as missile and bomb strikes of enemy military convoys (including by reconnaissance and strike UAVs);
  • the beginning of active actions of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and the Territorial Defense Forces to destroy sabotage and reconnaissance groups and columns of Russian troops as they enter settlements, and later on routes. At the same time, there was fierce resistance to the invaders in the positional areas on the outskirts of most cities in the Donbas conflict zone;
  • failures of airborne landings, most of which were dispersed and destroyed, including by local resistance. In the same way, sabotage and reconnaissance groups that landed from helicopters in cities were destroyed, as was the case, in particular, in Kharkiv;
  • problems with the logistics of Russian troops that invaded Ukraine. Given Russia’s plans to complete the main phase of the “special operation” in Ukraine within three days, this is the period for which the main types of supplies, which were taken with them by the forward units of the Russian army, were calculated. As a result, they quickly faced a shortage of ammunition, fuel and food. This problem began to become especially acute when the first echelons of the Russian army have gone far away from the borders of Belarus and Russia. As we pointed out in previous publications, the reasons for this were the lack of necessary supply stocks near the borders of Ukraine, as well as the destruction by Ukrainian resistance forces of a large part of the enemy’s logistics columns on their way through Ukrainian territory. Currently, traffic jams have been added to them, which leads to the formation of huge clusters of Russian military vehicles and makes their destruction easier.

 

All this has led to significant losses of Russian troops in Ukraine, demoralization of their personnel and a slowdown in the offensive. Under such circumstances, on the 4th-6th days of the war (depending on the situation in different areas of hostilities on Ukrainian territory), the Russian armed forces began to apply new tactics, which had the following features:

  • moving from attempts to capture mid-sized and large cities by columns of armored vehicles with the support of special forces to the classic assault operations. As part of this approach, Russian troops deployed near settlements, conducted artillery shelling, and then attacked Ukrainian positions with infantry forces supported by artillery, tanks and armored fighting vehicles. In some cases, forward units of Russian troops landed on the front line from helicopters (in particular, this tactic was used during attacks on the city of Mykolaiv, near the international airport in its eastern part);
  • preparation for the amphibious landings with the task of capturing the western part of the Black Sea coast of Ukraine and the city of Odesa. For this purpose, in the north-western part of the Black Sea, including in the territorial waters of Ukraine, a naval group of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation was concentrated, consisting of six large landing ships and several missile ships;
  • intensification of missile and air (missile and bomb) strikes on military and civilian infrastructure of Ukraine. Due to this, Russia tried to destroy, or at least weaken the defense potential of our state, as well as intimidate the Ukrainian government and citizens. In addition, by using the methods of air terrorism against the civilian population, Moscow hoped to force it to protest against the leadership of Ukraine demanding an end of the resistance;
  • adjustment of material and technical support of Russian troops in Ukraine. To this end, special logistics points have been set up in the rear areas of the main groups of the RF armed forces operating on Ukrainian territory. Some efforts have been focused on securing control of the roads used to supply the Russian army’s forward units;
  • involving battle groups of Russian troops that remained in Russia. In general, on days 10–11 of the war, Moscow used up to 100 % of its forces prepared to attack Ukraine. At the same time, due to lack of military resources, the Russians began to use units of airborne troops, special forces, Rosguard (internal troops) and police as ordinary infantry forces, which are not designed for this and do not have appropriate weapons.

 

However, these measures of Russia’s military leadership did not yield tangible results. In particular:

  • attempts to attack mid-sized and large cities were virtually unsuccessful and only increased the losses of Russian troops. Thus, on the 13th–14thdays of the war, about 25 % of Russian military who entered Ukraine were killed, wounded or taken prisoners of war, at least a quarter of Ukraine-focused aircrafts, more than 30 % of helicopters, tanks and armored fighting vehicles were destroyed;
  • missile and bomb strikes on military and civilian targets failed to weaken Ukraine’s defense capabilities or break the morale of its people. Moreover, Russia’s terrorist attacks have only strengthened the motivation of Ukraine’s defenders to destroy the aggressor, as well as led to a sharp rise in anti-Russian sentiment among Ukrainian citizens. Besides, the mass casualties among the civilian population and the destruction of schools, hospitals, kindergartens and housing have provided a clear basis for the West to impose additional sanctions on the Russian Federation;
  • the problem of logistics of the first echelons of Russian troops has not been satisfactorily resolved. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Territorial Defense Forces and local resistance continue to destroy logistical columns of Russian troops on their routes;
  • significant difficulties also arose with the replenishment of the Russian army on the territory of Ukraine, which was the result of a lack of combat-ready troops, prepared reserves and military equipment. Evidence of this was Russia’s involving in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine the militants of private military companies, forcibly mobilized members of the population of the “DPR” and “LPR”, as well as outdated military equipment.

 

As a result, Russia was again forced to change the forms of its actions, including:

  • it suspended direct attacks on mid-sized and large cities (except for some of them) and focused on city sieges. Besides, the Russian military command has so far abandoned the idea of an amphibious landing near the city of Odesa and returned its naval ships to Crimea;
  • reduced the use of aircrafts and helicopters and switched to individual terrorist attacks, mainly on civilian infrastructure. However, intense shelling of Ukraine’s frontline cities by missile and artillery systems continues;
  • began the rotation of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine, deploying additional forces to the Ukrainian direction from the depths of the Russian Federation and covert mobilization;
  • carried out personnel changes in the middle-level military command of the RF Armed Forces.

 

Based on the position of Moscow, which maintains its strategic goals towards Ukraine, after the restoration of its military potential on the Ukrainian direction Russia may intensify offensive actions. At the same time, according to some estimates, due to significant losses and lack of forces, in 7–10 days Moscow may “freeze” the war against Ukraine, namely – stop in the already occupied areas in anticipation of a critical aggravation of the socio-economic situation in our country and its agreeing to Russian ultimatums.

However, under any circumstances, Ukraine will not stop resisting the enemy and will do everything possible to destroy Russian troops on Ukrainian territory. Only this can stop Russia and force it to negotiate. This requires liquidation of at least two-thirds of the Russian army that attacked Ukraine. As noted above, we have already destroyed a third.

 

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