The Price of Mistakes. What Incorrect Estimates Lead To

vraevski

Ivan Sichen

 

 

As evidenced by the development of the situation around Russia’s war against Ukraine, the offensive of Russian troops has lost its initial momentum and slowed down in most of the main directions. At this, hostilities on the territory of Ukraine became protracted. Such a situation obviously thwarted Putin’s plans to seize Ukraine in a flash and, in fact, destroy it as an independent state. Of course, Russia’s military superiority allows it to achieve some success, but more and more at an ever-increasing cost for it.

Therefore, we would like to draw attention to the reasons for the failure of Moscow’s “blitzkrieg” and how it resolves them. Especially since every day of the continuation of the war accumulates extremely negative consequences for Russia, both from a military and economic point of view. And also – to discuss the question: what was the cost of the mistakes in assessing the situation for Russia and for Ukraine.

 

Despite overt warnings from the United States and NATO about Russia’s preparations for a full-scale war against Ukraine, many Ukrainian military experts did not believe in its possibility, which also influenced the country’s leadership’s views on the issue. All this had negative consequences for Ukraine in terms of ensuring a reliable level of defense capabilities of the country, at least at the initial stage of the war. However, this situation was an objective consequence of Russia’s new strategy, which differed significantly from its strategy in 2014, including on the eve of the Russian invasion of the Donbas conflict zone.

For example, from the beginning of 2021, Russia began active military preparations in the Ukrainian direction with signs of possible preparations for an attack on Ukraine. In particular, they included:

  • deployment of elements of wartime control and communication systems;
  • strengthening intelligence;
  • raising combat readiness and deploying air defense forces to field areas;
  • improvement and development of transport infrastructure;
  • checking and building up the logistics system of troops;
  • conducting offensive military exercises;
  • strengthening of troops of the RF Armed Forces near Ukraine at the expense of formations and units from other regions of Russia;
  • bringing Russian troops into Belarus under the guise of joint operational and combat trainings with the Belarusian army.

Such actions by Moscow included several stages that corresponded to the training periods of the RF Armed Forces. At this, their specific composition depended on the military-strategic situation around the Russian Federation (primarily, US/NATO military activity in the Mediterranean-Black Sea region), plans for operational and combat training of Russia’s Armed Forces, and Moscow’s foreign policy goals, including towards Ukraine.

Given the above circumstances, since the beginning of 2021 there had been three peaks of Russia’s military preparations near Ukraine, namely:

  • in April-March of 2021 as part of Moscow’s response to the US/NATO DEFENDER-Europe 21 strategic exercise;
  • in July-September of 2021 during the final stage and active phase of the strategic exercise of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and Belarus “West-2021”;
  • since last December, after the Kremlin put forward its well-known ultimatums to provide “security guarantees” to Russia.

In each of these cases, was conducted the entire complex of military preparations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation discussed above. However, none of them included the most significant measures that were typical for 2014, namely:

  • deployment of Russian troops in forward field areas along the entire border with Ukraine. At that time, one or two brigade tactical groups of the Russian Armed Forces were deployed to each of Ukraine’s neighboring regions, which were stationed in field camps in the immediate vicinity of the Ukrainian border (in fact, in the initial areas for the offensive). At this, engineering troops prepared the positions and built all the necessary field infrastructure;
  • creation of the second echelon of troops. In addition to the first echelon of troops in the immediate vicinity of Ukraine, in 2014, in fact, the second echelon was also created. Most of the troops of the second echelon were in Volgograd region of the Russian Federation (beneath the Rostov region) in the Donetsk direction, as well as in the North Caucasus – in the Crimean direction;
  • mass transfer to the Ukrainian direction of stocks of material and technical means, including ammunition, various types of military equipment, fuels and lubricants, food, etc. For this purpose, hundreds of railway echelons were involved, which openly moved towards Ukraine and unloaded in the neighboring regions of Russia.

Only after the completion of all these measures, which lasted several months, Russia was able to carry out a direct military invasion of the zone of armed conflict in the Donbas in late August 2014.

 

In preparation for a full-scale offensive on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia relied on the already deployed troops and infrastructure, as well as the supply reserves of the Western and Southern Military Districts of the Russian Armed Forces, including in the occupied territories of the Donbas and in the annexed Crimea. They were the basis of troops of the RF Armed Forces that invaded Ukraine from the East and South. At this, their concentration in the initial positions was carried out covertly and took only a few days. In this regard, in contrast to 2014, favorable factors for Russia were:

  • early deployment of its troops near the border with Ukraine, which had been carried out since 2014–2015 by the formation of new formations and units, as well as the construction of stationary military bases of the RF Armed Forces. First of all, this concerned the 20thCombined Arms Army (HQ – Voronezh) from the Western Military District, the 8th Combined Arms Army (HQ – Novocherkassk) and the 1st (HQ – Donetsk) and the 2nd (HQ – Luhansk) Army Corps (operational and tactical commands) of the Southern Military District, the 22nd Army Corps of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation (Crimea), as well as the 4th Army of the Air Force and Air Defense (HQ – Rostov-on-Don);
  • Russia’s improving its transport infrastructure, which allowed it to quickly deploy Russian troops to Ukraine from other parts of the country. The main role in fulfilling this task was played by: expanding the capacity of highways and railways from Moscow region in the south-western direction, which created conditions for the rapid transfer of units of the 1stTank Army of the Southern Military District to the eastern border of Ukraine; commissioning of the bridge across the Kerch Strait, which opened the possibility of operational deployment of troops of the 49th and 58th Combined Arms Armies of the Southern Military District from the North Caucasus to the Crimea.

Besides, on the eve of Russia’s new attack on Ukraine, several units of the 35th Combined Arms Army (Amur region) of the Eastern Military District were transferred to Belarus. This fact was officially recognized by Moscow, but the number of troops was announced significantly smaller. Under cover of the transfer of the 35th Army to Belarus and probably to Bryansk region of Russia, the 41st Combined Arms Army (Novosibirsk) from the Eastern Military District was also transferred.

 

At the expense of these forces, 117 battalion tactical groups with a total number of about 120,000 servicemen were formed, which was almost equal to all the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At this, they surpassed the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the number of heavy weapons, including tanks, armored combat vehicles, missile and artillery systems. And this is not to mention Russia’s total superiority in combat aviation.

According to the Russian leadership, all this, as well as the allegedly low combat capability of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, would allow Russia to gain a quick victory over Ukraine within a few days. It was from this calculation (for three days) that the troops were provided with material and technical supply, including food, fuel and lubricants, and ammunition.

At the same time, Moscow clearly hoped that a quick victory over Ukraine without great losses and destruction would allow Russia to avoid an overly harsh reaction of the West, like in 2014. At this, restoration of pro-Russian power in Ukraine, which would recognize the demands of the Kremlin, would formally remove the problem of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

 

Russia’s strategy (including the sudden attack on Ukraine simultaneously from several directions) enabled it to achieve a number of successes, in particular: the Russian troops’ coming to the north-western outskirts of Kyiv; breakthrough to Chernihiv, Sumy and Kharkiv; the actual surrounding of Mariupol; capture of Kherson and a number of other cities in the South and North of Ukraine.

However, Russia failed to achieve its strategic goals, and a few days after the start of the war, it was forced to slow down the offensive, abandon the assaults on the above-mentioned cities, and focus on capturing Kyiv. However, such attempts by Moscow, in fact, failed. Moreover, March 2–3, 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine counterattacked and pushed the enemy away from the approaches to Kyiv.

The reason for this situation was Russia’s overestimation of its capabilities and underestimation of Ukraine’s ability to repulse the aggressor. For example, Moscow obviously did not take into consideration:

  • high morale and fighting spirit, motivation and fighting ability of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, the Territorial Defense Forces, other law enforcement agencies and ordinary citizens from the resistance movement;
  • availability of effective weapons systems in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including ATGM, MANPADS, reconnaissance and strike UAVs, provided by Western partners, as well as modern weapons of our own production;
  • Russia’s inability to establish operational logistics for its troops on Ukrainian territory (both due to the lack of necessary supplies near Ukraine and the blocking of their supply routes by the Ukrainian Army and resistance forces).

As a result, the Russian troops that invaded Ukraine found themselves in an extremely difficult situation, which led to a reduction in their combat capabilities, significant losses and demoralization of personnel. Under these circumstances, Moscow resorted to intimidating Ukraine’s leadership and population by launching missile, bomb and artillery strikes on peaceful settlements, but such attempts by Russia also failed. In view of this, these actions of Russia were supplemented by nuclear blackmail, which, in fact, was the shelling and seizure by Russian troops of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

Russia is currently regrouping its troops, trying to provide them with logistics and supplies, waiting for the arrival of reserves and preparing for further offensives.

At the same time, Moscow’s next steps will depend on the effectiveness of new Western sanctions imposed on Russia over its attack on Ukraine.

 

Схожі публікації