Ousting of the Defense Forces of Ukraine Instead of a Strategic Breakthrough

The Military Strategy of the Russian Armed Forces at the Front

Ivan Sichen

In June 2024, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, President of the Russian Federation V. Putin confirmed that the strategy of the Russian army’s actions in Ukraine is changing, namely, instead of a large-scale breakthrough at the front, there will be a gradual ousting of Ukrainian troops from those territories that Moscow is trying to conquer. To this end, Russia seems to have the resources, which can be replenished by recruiting contract soldiers and increasing military production. V. Putin did not voice the reasons for such changes in Russian strategy, but they are quite obvious. Despite the fact that Moscow is trying to strengthen the Russian Armed Forces and increase their potential, they lack the strength to achieve strategic success in the war against Ukraine. In February-March 2022, the Russian Armed Forces seized large Ukrainian territories, but all their so-called achievements remain at the tactical level. That is why Russia is trying to exhaust Ukraine and its partners, imposing a protracted war, while relying on the superiority of its potential. However, according to many experts, such a strategy will not give Moscow the opportunity to significantly change the situation in its favor. Prolonging the war “plays both ways” and gives Ukraine additional time to improve its defense. This can also be said about Ukraine’s partners, who will also have time to increase the production of weapons, military equipment and ammunition, of course, in the interests of our state. Therefore, Russia’s war against Ukraine will increasingly become positional in nature, as during the First World War. And the victory will depend on the ability of the parties to provide their troops with the necessary forces and means, as well as to establish effective rear military logistics and support. Let’s consider such questions in more detail.

In order to determine the future prospects of Russia’s war against Ukraine, it is necessary to analyze what has happened on the front lately and what is happening right now.

As you know, since the beginning of 2024, the main military achievement of the Russians was the capture the city of Avdiivka near Donetsk, after which their troops advanced another 10 km in the western direction. The battles for Avdiivka lasted from February 2022 to February 2024, and the losses of the Russian army amounted to more than 13 thousand troops and 220 pieces of military equipment.

After Avdiivka, the Russian troops intensified offensive actions on almost the entire front line, and their main efforts were concentrated in Kupiansk, Lyman, Kramatorsk, Pokrovsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and some other directions. According to Moscow’s declarations, the goal of such an offensive is to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as to improve tactical positions of the Russian troops in other areas.

However, as before, this was and remains only a part of the Kremlin’s strategic plans, which envisage the capture of the entire east and south of Ukraine, and then the complete destruction of the independence of our state. It was for this purpose that Russia began to prepare larger-scale offensive operations, planning breakthroughs at the front with the aim to enter the operational space. And the corresponding decisions regarding their implementation depended and now depend on the results of tactical offensives and the available forces in the first echelons of the Russian troops, along with the possibility of replenishing them at the expense of reserves and mobilization resources.

By mid-April — early May 2024, the tactical offensives of the Russian Armed Forces looked quite successful. Russian troops slowly but stubbornly advanced in certain directions and captured new settlements. The greatest of these achievements was the Russian troops’ reaching the eastern outskirts of the city of Chasiv Yar, which, in fact, is a forward area for further development of the Russian offensive on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Most likely, this direction was chosen by the Russian military command for the main strike aimed at a strategic breakthrough deep into the territory of Ukraine.

But already in May 2024, the offensives of the invaders somewhat slowed down. Unfortunately, the Defense Forces of Ukraine did not manage to finally stop the enemy, but they managed to buy time for the construction of engineering fortifications. Of course, if they had been built earlier, they would have been more effective and strengthened the defenses properly. Nevertheless, the fortifications played their role. In some places, including in the city of Chasiv Yar, the enemy approached the Ukrainian fortifications, but was not able to break through them. Especially since the defense lines have many echelons and also are covered by troops in the rear areas, at least in the main directions of Russian offensives. As a result, the war actually became a positional one with relatively minor advances of Russian and Ukrainian troops.

Under such circumstances, in May 2024, the Russian Armed Forces again attacked Kharkiv region of Ukraine from the north. The Kremlin’s excuse was the “necessity to create a buffer zone” that would prevent shelling of the border areas of Belgorod region of the Russian Federation from Ukraine’s territory. However, in reality, Russia tried to withdraw the Defense Forces of Ukraine and their reserves from the eastern part of the front, to surround and destroy Ukrainian troops near Kupiansk, to intensify the terrorist shelling of the city of Kharkiv, bringing field artillery positions closer to it, and also to cause panic among the local population and in general increase tensions in Ukraine.

After the Russian troops’ certain achievements, which were mainly the result of miscalculations by the military command of some Ukrainian units in the border zone of Kharkiv region, the Russian offensive was slowed down and then stopped. And the hostilities now continue mainly at a distance of 8–9 km from the border. The most active hostilities are taking place in the northern part of the city of Vovchansk and near the villages of Lyptsi and Hlyboke, where the enemy is suffering significant losses. Despite this, the enemy does not give up its goals, regrouping its troops and strengthening them by redeploying units from other directions (in particular, from the southern section of the front).

Quite possibly, the Russian Armed Forces can also invade Sumy and Chernihiv regions of Ukraine with the same goal of diverting resources of the Defense Forces of Ukraine. Since the beginning of 2024, the activities of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups have noticeably intensified in the border areas of those regions of Ukraine. Sometimes they manage to enter Ukrainian settlements located in the “gray zone”, which Russian propaganda later presents as “the beginning of a new offensive”. For the most part, such information is provocative, but Ukraine needs to respond appropriately to the attacker’s actions in order to prevent enemy breakthroughs and a repeat of the February-March 2022 situation. And this, again, diverts the resources of the Defense Forces of Ukraine from hostilities in the east.

Nevertheless, Russia did not manage to create the necessary conditions for the simultaneous strategic offensive operations in several directions. As already mentioned, the Russian troops got stuck in positional battles and so far have not been able to occupy the necessary forward areas, even for a breakthrough into the tactical depth of the fortified Ukrainian positions. The Russians’ minor advances which are currently being observed, are limited only to the forward defense lines of the main defense positions of the Ukrainian troops. Although even such advances are no more than a few hundred meters.

A significant problem for the Russian military command is the concentration of the necessary number of troops for a large-scale offensive, especially in several directions. According to different data, Russia has concentrated 550,000 to 620,000 troops at the front and around Ukraine (despite V. Putin’s assertion of a phantom 700,000). It would seem that such a number is quite enough for Moscow to be able to achieve what it wants. However, the given indicators concern not only the combat component, but also the personnel of auxiliary units, as well as the Russian Guard, the FSB, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and other paramilitary structures. Besides, they troops are dispersed on the significant front line with a length of 3.2 thousand km. And active hostilities are being conducted at the front with a total length of 1.2–1.5 thousand km. At the same time, the tactical depth of the combat formations of the Russian troops reaches 30 km, and with the operational rear — 200 km. That is, the masses of troops accumulated by Russia are dispersed in depth and length. Therefore, the Russian military command is forced to redeploy them to the most important areas, weakening other sections of the front. And as evidenced by the situation in the north of Kharkiv region, Russia has no additional reserves.

Besides, in the opinion of Western experts, the “window of opportunities” for a successful large-scale offensive at the front is increasingly narrowing for Russia, not to mention several offensives in different directions. First of all, I mean the resumption of the supply of weapons to Ukraine by Western countries, which helps us to cope with the problem of their shortage. By the way, at the beginning of 2024 the weapons shortage became the main reason for the successes of the Russian troops at the front. Currently, the USA and Europe not only deliver artillery shells to Ukraine, which are in warehouses, but also speed up and increase their mass production at their defense enterprises. Of course, it is not realistic to immediately reach full production capacity to be equal to Russia, but the allies are persistently working on it.

Already in the summer of 2024, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will receive F-16 fighter jets, which will significantly strengthen the air defense of our country, as well as provide additional opportunities to strike enemy positions directly on the front line and in tactical depth. For example, the F-16 armament allows to neutralize the enemy’s ballistic and cruise missiles, including over its territory. In addition, F-16 fighter jets can successfully counter Russian Su-34 fighter-bombers, which drop guided aerial bombs (GBUs) from deep within Russian territory at a range of up to 90 km from the combat zone. And also, the F-16 is able to carry up to six GBUs and use them without entering the Russian air defense zone.

The delivery of additional air defense, missile and artillery systems, armored vehicles, etc. to Ukraine is also underway. Some countries consider the possibility of sending their troops, or at least instructors, to Ukraine. Consultations are being held regarding the covering of the airspace over the western regions of our country by the NATO countries neighboring Ukraine.

At the same time, in May-June 2024, leading partners of Ukraine granted permission to use their long-range weapons against the Russian military assets located on Russian territory. Now the Defense Forces of Ukraine are able to strike the concentration points and exit areas of Russian troops, as well as their command posts, warehouses, advanced airfields and other targets in the regions of the Russian Federation adjacent to Ukraine. And this will significantly complicate the offensive of the Russian troops.

In general, 16 % of the Russian territory is subject to potential retaliatory strikes by the Defense Forces of Ukraine. The first of them were carried out north of the city of Belgorod on Russian S-300 missile systems, which shelled the city of Kharkiv. As a result, the intensity of such shelling significantly decreased, at least temporarily. And the Russian air defense system in Crimea is being destroyed faster than the invaders are restoring it. Military airfields are next. As early as 2022–2023, Moscow was forced to withdraw its combat aircrafts from the borders of Ukraine, and soon it will be faced with the need to hide them in the deep rear. The same applies to the remains of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.

Qualitatively new problems await Russia’s defense enterprises and oil refining facilities. They also are legitimate targets for the Defense Forces of Ukraine, which systematically attack them using domestic UAVs. And Western missiles will make it possible to do this much more efficiently, which will complicate the logistics of Russian troops and the production of weapons and military equipment.

All this forces Moscow to resort to the strategy of gradually ousting units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine from their positions on certain sections of the front line, where Russian troops have an advantage. At the same time, as before, regardless of the losses, “meat assaults” are carried out, accompanied by massive artillery, missile and air attacks on the strongholds of the Ukrainian troops, their rear and logistical routes. Such a strategy brings Russia certain successes, although it requires significant resources. And they are not as endless as Moscow assures, or as it may seem at first glance. In my previous publications, I have repeatedly had to raise this issue, but it is worth addressing it again, since it is currently of key importance for the further course of the war.

Let’s start with the capabilities of the Russian Federation to provide troops with personnel. As the Kremlin claims, there are no problems with this. But, in fact, there are. For example, as a result of the exodus from Russia of more than 1.5 million citizens after the announcement of partial mobilization in September 2022, as well as the conscription of up to one million people, the country has experienced an acute shortage of personnel in all spheres.

On the one hand, this has a negative impact on the Russian economy, and on the other — it forces employers to raise their employees’ wages, which in a number of cases already reach the level of payments for military personnel at the front. Although even a quarter of such payments without risks to life and health would fully satisfy the majority of Russian citizens. That is why fewer and fewer people want to join the Russian army. Especially when the Kremlin’s promises regarding social guarantees to military are violated at all levels. As a result, the recruitment of contract volunteers barely covers combat losses.

In fact, V. Putin admitted this at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum. According to him, about 5,000 Russian troops are killed at the front every month. That is, together with the wounded, the total number of casualties can be up to 20,000 people, and given Putin’s obvious understatement of the number of killed, the total monthly loss of the Russian army can be up to 30,000 people. According to the official data of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, which are repeated by Putin, the same number are called up for military service into the Russian army every month.

The picture with military equipment in the Russian army is even worth. There is still no shortage of it at the front. There are sufficient stocks of small arms. Ammunition, including artillery shells, is still being produced in sufficient quantities. The situation with UAVs and missiles is more complicated, which forces Moscow to purchase them from Iran and North Korea. The same can be said about armored combat vehicles, barrel and rocket artillery, as well as heavy air defense systems. Losses of such military equipment at the front exceed their production. The production of combat tanks is not even counted in dozens, and their need in the troops is met by the modernization of old machines that are in storage. Since 2022, such reserves have almost halved. And a piecemeal production of aircrafts cannot compensate for their losses at the front.

Of course, Ukraine is not in the best condition. But thanks to the help of its Western partners, it has a chance to “reset” the war and seize the initiative at the front. It is very difficult, but not impossible. It is worth hoping that the consolidation of the efforts of Ukraine’s partners around the raised issue will yield results and help to achieve victory.

The peace summit in Switzerland, with events in Ukraine on the agenda, was supposed to reinforce such prospects. Despite all Russia’s attempts to downplay its importance, such a global event objectively acts as a catalyst for international support for our state. In the near term, such support is unlikely to negate Moscow’s military advantages, but it will significantly increase Ukraine’s ability to counter the aggressor, including thanks to higher-quality weapons and the latest technologies of our Western partners.